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UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT
Prefatory Note
Overview
This prefatory note is designed to facilitate understanding of the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act by:
* providing an overview of what collaborative law is, its growth and
development, and its benefits to parties, the public, and the legal
profession;
* summarizing main provisions of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act;
* discussing the major policy issues addressed during the act's
development and drafting-for example, appropriate scope of
regulation, informed consent, and domestic violence; and
* identifying the reasons why the Uniform Collaborative Law Act should
be a uniform act.
The text of the act, with comments on specific sections, follows this
prefatory note. The comments address the purpose of a specific section and
issues in the drafting and interpretation of that section.

Collaborative Law-An Overview
Definition
Collaborative law is a voluntary, contractually based alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") process for parties who seek to negotiate a resolution of
their matter rather than having a ruling imposed upon them by a court or
arbitrator. The distinctive feature of collaborative law, as compared to other
forms of ADR such as mediation, is that parties are represented by lawyers
("collaborative lawyers") during negotiations. Collaborative lawyers do not
represent the party in court, but only for the purpose of negotiating agreements.
The parties agree in advance that their lawyers are disqualified from further
representing parties by appearing before a tribunal if the collaborative law
process ends without complete agreement ("disqualification requirement"). See
William H. Schwab, CollaborativeLawyering: A Closer Look at an Emerging
Practice, 4 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 351, 358 (2004). Parties thus retain
collaborative lawyers for the limited purpose of acting as advocates and
counselors during the negotiation process.

The Collaborative Law Participation Agreement
The basic ground rules for collaborative law are set forth in a written
agreement ("collaborative law participation agreement") in which parties
designate collaborative lawyers and agree not to seek tribunal (usually judicial)
resolution of a dispute during the collaborative law process. Pauline H. Tesler,
Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 319 (2004). The
participation agreement also provides that if a party seeks judicial intervention,
or otherwise terminates the collaborative law process, the disqualification
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requirement takes effect. Id. at 319-20. Parties agree that they have a mutual
right to terminate collaborative law at any time without giving a reason.
Positional and Problem-Solving Negotiations and the Disqualification
Requirement
The goal of collaborative law is to encourage parties to engage in
"problem-solving" rather than "positional" negotiations. See ROGER FISHER ET
AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 4-14 (2d
ed. 1991). Under a positional approach to negotiation, the parties see the
negotiation process as a contest to be won by one side at the expense of the
other. Id. at 6. Parties to positional negotiations often assume an extreme
starting position, and make small concessions within their predetermined
bargaining range usually in response to concessions made by the other side or
threats. Id. If they do not find a meeting point of agreement between their
positions, negotiations break down and litigation ensues. JULIE MACFARLANE,
THE NEW LAWYER: How SETTLEMENT Is TRANSFORMING THE PRACTICE OF
LAW 81-84 (2008) [hereinafter MACFARLANE, NEW LAWYER].

In contrast, parties who follow a problem-solving, or what is sometimes
referred to as interest-based approach to negotiation promoted by collaborative
law, view a dispute as the parties' joint problem that needs to be solved. Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View ofLegal Negotiation: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754, 759-60 (1984). Under this approach,
the negotiation process focuses on the parties' underlying "needs, desires,
concerns, and fears" and not only on the parties' articulated positions. FISHER ET
AL., supra, at 40. A problem-solving approach assumes that "[b]ehind opposed
positions lie shared and compatible interests, as well as conflicting ones," and
that looking at interests rather than positions is beneficial because "for every
interest there usually exist several possible positions that could satisfy it." Id. at
42. Accordingly, a problem-solving negotiator focuses on "finding creative
solutions that maximize the outcome for both sides." Peter Robinson,
Contending with Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: A Cautiously Cooperative
Approach to Mediation Advocacy, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 963, 965 (1998).

Lawyers can and do, of course, encourage clients to engage in problemsolving negotiations without formally labeling the process collaborative law.
The distinctive feature of collaborative law is, however, the disqualification
requirement-the enforcement mechanism that parties create by contract to
ensure that problem-solving negotiations actually occur. The disqualification
requirement enables each party to penalize the other party for unacceptable
negotiation behavior if the party who wants to end the collaborative law process
is willing to assume the costs of engaging new counsel. "[E]ach side knows at
the start that the other has similarly tied its own hands by making litigation
expensive. By hiring two Collaborative Law practitioners, the parties send a
powerful signal to each other that they truly intend to work together to resolve
their differences amicably through settlement." Scott R. Peppet, The Ethics of
CollaborativeLaw, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 131, 133.

Because of these mutually agreed upon costs of failure to agree,
collaborative law is a modem method of addressing the age old dilemma for

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/2

6

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: Uniform Collaborative Law Act

2009]1

UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LA WACT

427

parties to a negotiation of assuring that "one's negotiating counterpart is and
will continue to be a true collaborator rather than a 'sharpie."' Ted Schneyer,
The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 289, 327 (2008). It solves the age old
problem for negotiators of deciding whether to cooperate or compete in a
situation where each side does not know the other's intentions and "when the
pursuit of self-interest by each leads to a poor outcome for all"-the famous
"Prisoner's Dilemma" of game theory. ROBERT ALEXROD, THE EVOLUTION OF
COOPERATION 7 (1984).
Multiple Models of Collaborative Law Practice

To encourage problem-solving negotiations, collaborative lawyers
emphasize that no threats of litigation should be made during a collaborative
law process and the need to maintain respectful dialogue. See GLOBAL
COLLABORATIVE LAW COUNCIL, PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT 3 (2004),
available at http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/GCLCParticipation_
AgreementWith Addendum.pdf. Parties in collaborative law generally agree
to disclose information voluntarily, without formal discovery requests, and to
supplement responses to information requests previously made with material
changes. See id. at 4. Many models of collaborative law require parties to
engage jointly retained mental health and financial professionals in advisory and
neutral roles-for example, a divorce coach, appraiser, and child's
representative-rather than as consultants or trial witnesses hired by one party
but not the other. FORREST S. MOSTEN, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE HANDBOOK:
HELPING FAMILIES WITHOUT GOING TO COURT 106-07 (2009); See John Lande,
Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1315, 1321 n.13 (2003) [hereinafter Lande, Possibilities for
Collaborative Law]. Sometimes, collaborative law participation agreements
require that negotiations take place in meetings in which parties are the primary
negotiators and their lawyers encourage focusing on underlying interests,
sharing information, and brainstorming solutions to problems. GLOBAL
COLLABORATIVE LAW COUNCIL, supra, at 2-3. Typically, in order to promote
problem-solving negotiations, collaborative law participation agreements
provide that communications during the collaborative law process are
confidential and cannot be introduced as evidence in court. See id. at 4-5; see
also N.Y. Ass'n of Collaborative Professionals, Collaborative Law Participation
(last
Agreement, http://collaborativelawny.com/participation-agreement.php
visited May 25, 2010).
Collaborative Law Compared to Mediation

Mediation and collaborative law are both valuable ADR processes that
share common characteristics. They do have differences that might make one
process more or less attractive to parties. Both collaborative law and mediation
offer parties the benefits of a process to promote agreement through private,
confidential negotiations, the promise of cost reduction, and the potential for
better relationships. Both mediation and collaborative law encourage voluntary
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disclosure and an ethic of fair dealing between parties. Parties in both mediation
and collaborative law are likely to experience greater voice in the process of
settlement than in a judicial resolution (self-determination) and are more likely
to be satisfied with the process as compared to litigation. See Chris Guthrie &
James Levin, A "Party Satisfaction" Perspective on a Comprehensive
Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885, 891 (1998).

Mediation and collaborative law do, however, have differences which
might make collaborative law more or less attractive to some parties as a dispute
resolution option. A neutral is not present during collaborative law process
negotiation sessions unless agreed to by the parties, while mediation sessions
are facilitated by a neutral third party. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR

MEDIATORS pmbl. (2005). As will be discussed infra, parties can participate in
mediation without counsel but cannot do so in collaborative law. In many states
parties do not have the protection of mediators being a licensed and regulated
profession and bound by its rules of professional responsibility. Collaborative
lawyers, in contrast, are licensed and regulated members of the legal profession.
Mediators, as neutrals, cannot give candid legal advice to a party while
collaborative lawyers can. Mediators, as neutrals, are also constrained in
redressing imbalances in the knowledge and sophistication of parties. See, e.g.,
RULES OF THE CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE, 30 N.Y. Reg. 93 (July 30, 2008) (detailing

the neutrality requirement for mediators in New York); id § II(B) ("A mediator
shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives
the appearance of partiality."); MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY &
DIVORCE MEDIATION § IV (2000) ("A family mediator shall conduct the

mediation process in an impartial manner."). Despite their limited purpose of
representation in negotiating a resolution of a dispute, collaborative lawyers are
not neutrals but are advocates for their clients.
These kinds of considerations might make parties opt for collaborative law
over mediation for resolution of their dispute or vice versa. Collaborative law is
an attractive dispute resolution option for many parties, especially those who
wish to maintain post dispute relationships with each other and minimize the
costs of dispute resolution. Parties may prefer it to traditional full service
representation by lawyers, which includes both settlement negotiations and
representation in court, because of its reduced costs and incentives for lawyers
to work hard to produce acceptable compromise while still providing the party
with the support of an advocate.
Collaborative Law's Growth and Development
The concept of collaborative law was first described by Minnesota lawyer
Stu Webb approximately eighteen years ago in the context of representation in
divorce proceedings, the leading subject area for collaborative law practice
today. Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: An Alternative for Attorneys Suffering
'Family Law Burnout,' MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST, July 2000, at 7, 7. Since

then, collaborative law has matured and emerged as a viable option on the
continuum of choices of dispute resolution processes available to parties to
attempt to resolve a matter. Examples of its growth and development include:
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Roughly 22,000 lawyers worldwide have been trained in collaborative
law. Telephone Interview by Ashley Lorance with Talia Katz,
Executive Dir., Int'l Acad. of Collaborative Prof'ls (Feb. 17, 2009) (on
file with Reporter) [hereinafter Interview with Talia Katz]; see also
Christopher M. Fairman, A Proposed Model Rule for Collaborative
Law, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 73, 83 (2005) (noting that there
are "more than 4,500 lawyers trained in collaborative law" nationwide
(citing Jane Gross, Amiable Unhitching, with a Prod,N.Y. TIMES, May
20, 2004, at Fl)).
Collaborative law has been used to resolve thousands of cases in the
United States, Canada, and elsewhere. Christopher M. Fairman,
Growing Pains: Changes in CollaborativeLaw and the Challenge of
Legal Ethics, 30 CAMPBELL L. REv. 237, 239 (2008) [hereinafter
Fairman, GrowingPains].
The International Association of Collaborative Professionals (IACP),
the umbrella organization for collaborative lawyers, has more than
3,600 lawyer members. Interview with Talia Katz, supra.
Collaborative law practice associations and groups have been
organized in virtually every state in the nation and in several foreign
jurisdictions.
See
IACP,
Collaborative
Practice
Groups,
http://www.collaborativepractice.com/_t.asp?M=7&T=PracticeGroups
(last visited May 25, 2010).
A number of states have enacted statutes of varying length and
complexity which recognize and authorize collaborative law. See, e.g.,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (defining
"collaborative law process" and authorizing parties to agree in writing
to use of the process); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to -79 (2007)
(authorizing the use of collaborative law as "an alternative to judicial
disposition of issues arising in a civil action"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.0072 (Vernon 2008) (governing collaborative law agreements
for parent-child relationship); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon
2006) (governing collaborative law agreements for divorcing parties).
A number of courts have taken similar action through enactment of
court rules. See, e.g., MINN. R. 111.05, 304.05 (2008) (defining
collaborative law and detailing scheduling and application of additional
ADR requirements); CONTRA COSTA COUNTY, CAL., LOCAL CT. R.

12.5 ("Contra Costa County Superior Court strongly supports the use
of the collaborative law process .

.

."); L.A. COUNTY, CAL., LOCAL

CT. R. 14.26 (detailing the designation, contested matters, and
termination of collaborative law cases); S.F. COUNTY, CAL., LocAL

CT. R. 11.17(B), (E) (including collaborative law in its definition of
ADR procedures and specifying the requirements for its use); SONOMA
COUNTY, CAL., LOCAL CT. R. 9.26 ("Sonoma County Superior Court

strongly supports the use of the collaborative law process. . . ."); LA.
DIST. CT. R. tit. IV, ch. 39, R. 39.0 (defining collaborative divorce
procedures in Louisiana's twenty-fourth judicial district court); UTAH
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R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-510 (2009) (defining collaborative law and outlining
the responsibilities of ADR providers).
The first empirical research on collaborative law found generally high
levels of client and lawyer satisfaction with the process and that
negotiation under collaborative law participation agreements is more
problem-solving and interest-based than those in the more traditional
adversarial framework. See JULIE MACFARLANE, DEP'T OF JUSTICE OF
CAN., THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW

(CFL): A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 57, 77-78 (2005)

available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/fcy-fea/lib-bib/rep-rap/
2005/2005_1/pdf/2005_1.pdf [hereinafter MACFARLANE, EMERGING
PHENOMENON]; see also MARK SEFTON,

COLLABORATIVE FAMILY

LAW: A REPORT FOR RESOLUTION 43-48 (2009) (noting similar
findings in first empirical evaluation of cases in collaborative law

process in England and Wales); Julie Macfarlane, Experiences of
Collaborative Law: Preliminary Results from the Collaborative
Lawyering Research Project, 2004 J. DiSP. RESOL. 179, 200. It found
no evidence that "weaker" parties fared worse in collaborative law than
in adversarial based negotiations.
PHENOMENON supra, at 57, 77.

*

MACFARLANE,

EMERGING

Former Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye of New York established the first
court-based Collaborative Family Law Center in the nation in New
York City. JUDITH S. KAYE, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYs., THE
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY 11 (2007). In announcing the Center, Chief

*

Judge Kaye stated: "[w]e anticipate that spouses who choose this
approach will find that the financial and emotional cost of divorce is
reduced for everyone involved-surely a step in the right direction."
Id. at 12. The Center began operations on September 1, 2009. Press
Release, Ann Pfau, Chief Admin. Judge, N.Y. State Unified Family
Court Sys., Collaborative Family Law Center to Make Divorce Process
Easier New Center to Reduce Stress, Expense and Time Involved in
Matrimonial
Cases
(Sept.
1,
2009),
available
at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/press/pr2009_1 5.shtml.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") Dispute Resolution Section
has organized a Committee on Collaborative Law. Am. Bar Ass'n,
Collaborative
Law
Committee,
http://www.abanet.org/dch/
committee.cfm?com-DR035000 (last visited May 25, 2010). The
Collaborative Law Committee has an active Ethics Subcommittee
engaged in the codification of the standards of practice for
collaborative lawyers. SUMMARY OF ETHICS RULES GOVERNING
COLLABORATIVE LAW 3 (2008) (discussing the ways in which

*

"[c]ollaborative [p]ractice is consistent with the rules of ethics for
lawyers" and is an important method for achieving fair settlements).
Collaborative law is developing worldwide. Australia, Austria, Canada,
the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Israel, New Zealand,
Switzerland, Uganda, and the United Kingdom all report collaborative
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law activity. Robert Miller, How We Can All Get Along, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 3, 2008, at 2D. For example:
0 Collaborative law has grown rapidly in Canada since its
introduction in 2000-from 75 lawyers trained in
collaborative practice to more than 2,800 in 2009. Susan Pigg,
Collaboration,Not Litigation: Many Divorcing Couples Are
Sitting Down Together,A long with Their Lawyers, to Hammer
Out Agreements, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 28, 2009, at LO1.

o

Despite only being introduced to Australia in 2003,
collaborative law has experienced rapid growth. FAMILY LAW
COUNCIL, COLLABORATIVE PRACTICE IN FAMILY LAW: A
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL PREPARED BY THE

FAMILY LAW COUNCIL 27-33 (2006).

The Family Law

Council Report, released by Attorney-General Philip Ruddock
in April 2007, hypothesized that "collaborative law ha[d] the
potential to deliver ongoing benefits to the public." Sue
Purdon, Divorcing with Dignity, COURIER MAIL (Austl.), Apr.

o

13, 2007, at 26. Approximately 400 lawyers have been trained
in collaborative law from 2005 to 2007. Id.
Britain's leading family judges and lawyers began a campaign
to encourage divorcing couples to participate in collaborative
law. Frances Gibb, Family Judges Campaign to Take the
Bitterness and Costs Out ofDivorce, TIMES (London), Oct. 4,
2007, at 2. About 1,200 lawyers have been trained in
collaborative law in England since its introduction in 2003.
SEFTON, supra,at 3.

o

As of May 2008, about 600 Irish lawyers have been trained in
collaborative law. Carol Coulter, New Form of Law Aims to
Meet Wider Human Needs, IRISH TIMES, May 5, 2008, at 4.

*

When Ireland hosted the second European Collaborative Law
Conference in May 2008 the Republic of Ireland's President,
Mary McAleese, announced that collaborative law was the
preferred method of dispute resolution in Ireland. Miller,
supra.
Many professionals from other disciplines, especially financial
planning and psychology, have been trained to participate in
collaborative law. See Gary L. Voegele et al., Collaborative Law: A
Useful Tool for the Family Law Practitioner to Promote Better
Outcomes, 33 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 971, 976 (2007) (citing PAULINE
H. TESLER & PEGGY THOMPSON, COLLABORATIVE DIVORCE: THE
REVOLUTIONARY NEW WAY TO RESTRUCTURE YOUR FAMILY,
RESOLVE LEGAL ISSUES, AND MOVE ON WITH YOUR LIFE 41-50

*

(2006)).
Numerous articles have been written about collaborative law in
scholarly journals. See generally Gay G. Cox & Robert J. Matlock, The
Case for CollaborativeLaw, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 45 (2004)
(arguing that collaborative law be the default method of family dispute
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resolution); Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative
Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats on New Heads, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP.
RESOL. 505 (2003) (suggesting the need for new ethical guidelines to
encompass the innovative practice of collaborative lawyering);
Fairman, Growing Pains, supra (discussing the tension between
collaborative law and lawyer's ethics); Joshua Isaacs, A New Way to
Avoid the Courtroom: The Ethical Implications Surrounding
CollaborativeLaw, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 833 (2005) (suggesting
that new ethical standards are necessary to add credibility and clarity to
the collaborative law process); Michaela Keet et al., Client
Engagement Inside CollaborativeLaw, 24 CAN. J. FAM. L. 145 (2008)
(exploring clients' experiences within the collaborative law process);
John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the Family Fuss:
Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for
Negotiating Divorce Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280 (2004) (analyzing
the differences between mediation, collaborative, and cooperative law);
Lande, Possibilitiesfor CollaborativeLaw, supra (considering whether
disqualification agreements, common in collaborative law, may violate
ethical norms and harm clients); John Lande, Principles for
PolicymakingAbout CollaborativeLaw and Other ADR Processes, 22
OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 619 (2007) (discussing the types of
substantive policy options that policymakers should adopt when
dealing with ADR processes); James K. L. Lawrence, Collaborative
Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J.
ON DisP. RESOL. 431 (2002) (encouraging lawyers to incorporate
collaborative law into every day practice and dispute resolution);
Lawrence P. McLellan, Expanding the Use of Collaborative Law:
Considerationof Its Use in a Legal Aid Programfor Resolving Family
Law Disputes, 2008 J. DisP. RESOL. 465 (exploring the use of
collaborative law in legal aid settings with predominate family law
issues); Forrest S. Mosten, CollaborativeLaw Practice:An Unbundled
Approach to Informed Client Decision Making, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL.
163 [hereinafter Mosten, Collaborative Law Practice] (exploring the
creation and development of collaborative law and unbundled legal
services); Peppet, supra (suggesting that collaborative lawyers need to
be careful about their practice in order to withstand ethical scrutiny);
Scott R. Peppet, Lawyers' Bargaining Ethics, Contract, and
Collaboration: The End of the Legal Profession and the Beginning of
ProfessionalPluralism, 90 IOWA L. REV. 475 (2005) (suggesting the
need for ethics to assist clients in sorting between honest collaborators
and manipulative adversaries); Schneyer, supra (considering the
mainstream bar's response to collaborative law and the development of
specialized inter-professional association within the collaborative
process); Sherri Goren Slovin, The Basics of Collaborative Family
Law: A Divorce Paradigm Shift, 18 AM. J. FAM. L. 74 (2004)
(providing an overview of the basic principles of the collaborative
process); Larry R. Spain, CollaborativeLaw: A Critical Reflection on
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Whether a Collaborative Orientation Can Be Ethically Incorporated
into the PracticeofLaw, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 141 (2004) (suggesting a
need for ethical standards in order to facilitate the practice of
collaborative problem-solving); Pauline H. Tesler, CollaborativeLaw:
A New Paradigmfor Divorce Lawyers, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
967 (1999) (suggesting that collaborative law is less emotionally
draining than adversarial practice, especially in the realm of family
law); Voegele et al., supra (discussing the history and distinct features
of the collaborative law process); Stu Webb, Collaborative Law: A
Practitioner'sPerspective on Its History and Current Practice, 21 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 155 (2008) (reflecting on the creation and
development of collaborative law); Brian Roberson, Comment, Let's
Get Together: An Analysis of the Applicability of the Rules of
Professional Conduct to CollaborativeLaw, 2007 J. DisP. RESOL. 255
(exploring the intersection of collaborative law and the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and discussing the differences among state ethics
committees' commentary on collaborative law); Elizabeth K.
Strickland, Comment, Putting "Counselor" Back in the Lawyer's Job
Description: Why More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law
Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REv. 979 (2006) (proposing a statute for state
adoption so that collaborative law can be more frequently utilized in
dispute resolution).
Numerous articles have also been written about collaborative law in the
popular press. See generally Michelle Conlin, Good Divorce, Good
Business: Why More Husband-and-Wife Teams Keep Working
Together After They Split, Bus. WK., Oct. 31, 2005, at 90 (discussing
how divorcing couples are shifting to collaborative law to retain assets
and jointly run businesses); Carol Coulter, Non-Adversarial System
'Will Replace the Courts' to Resolve Family Law Disputes, IRISH
TIMES, May 3, 2008, at 8 (suggesting that collaborative dispute
resolution will eventually replace the adversarial process in family law
problems); Clare Dyer, Law: Round-Table Divorce Is Faster,Cheaper
and Friendlier,GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 27, 2006, at 14 (reporting
on the history and expansion of collaborative law in the United
Kingdom); Mary Flood, Legal Trade: Collaborative Law Can Make
Divorces Cheaper, Civilized, Hous. CHRON., June 4, 2007, at 1
(reporting on the history and growth of collaborative law in the
matrimonial sector); Carla Fried, Getting a Divorce? Why It Pays to
Play Nice: CollaborativeDivorce Offers Splitting Spouses a Kinder,
Less Expensive Way to Say "I Don't," MONEY, July 2005, at 48
(describing how collaborative law can save divorcing couples money);
Katti Gray, Collaborative Divorce: There's a Kinder, Simpler-And
Less Expensive-Way to Untie the Knot, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Aug.
15, 2005, at BlO (discussing the advantages of the collaborative law
process in divorce); Gross, supra, (discussing how collaborative law is
an interest-based solution for divorcing couples that can save them
time, money, and misery); Melissa Harris, Same Split with a Lot Less
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Spat: Howard Teams Guide CollaborativeDivorce, BALTIMORE SUN,
Oct. 5, 2007, at lA (reporting on the growing amounts of collaborative
divorces in Maryland); Rosanne Michie, Curing a Splitting Headache,
HERALD SUN (Austl.), Feb. 25, 2008, at 30 (reporting that the
Australian Family Law Act and Rules were amended to require
divorcing couples to resolve disputes through alternative resolutions,
such as collaborative law); Pigg, supra (reporting on the introduction
of collaborative law in Canada); Jon Robins, At Last: A Divorce
Process for Adults, OBSERVER (Eng.), Dec. 30, 2007, at 12
(anticipating that collaborative law will become the norm for divorcing
parties in the United Kingdom); Janet Kidd Stewart, CollaborationIs
Critical: Couples Find That Breaking Up Doesn't Have to Mean
Breaking the Bank, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 9, 2005, at 3 (describing how
collaborative law can save divorcing couples money); The Today Show
(NBC television broadcast Jan. 17, 2006), available at
(broadcasting
http://www.collaborativelawny.com/todayshow.php
Ann Curry, collaborative lawyers, and their clients discussing
collaborative divorce).
Collaborative Law Outside of Divorce and Family Disputes
Collaborative Law has thus far found its greatest use and acceptance in
family and divorce disputes. Efforts are, however, underway to expand its use in
matters outside of divorce and family practice. See Kathy A. Bryan, Why Should
Businesses Hire Settlement Counsel?, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 195, 196 (stating
that "[collaborative law] techniques should be added to the business dispute
resolution toolbox"); R. Paul Faxon & Michael Zeytoonian, PrescriptionFor
Sanity in Resolving Business Disputes: Civil Collaborative Practice in a
Business Restructuring Case, COLLABORATIVE L.J., Fall 2007, at 2, 2-3

(illustrating the use of collaborative law in shareholder disputes). See generally
SHERRIE R. ABNEY, AVOIDING LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO CIVIL COLLABORATIVE

LAW (2005) (recounting her own experiences practicing collaborative law in
Texas and expressing the need to expand the practice beyond family matters). In
January 2009, the Global Collaborative Law Council was formed to expand the
use of collaborative law in areas outside of family and divorce law. Global
Collaborative Law Council, About GCLC, http://www.collaborativelaw.us/
about.html (last visited May 25, 2010).
Collaborative Law's Benefits to Parties and the Public
Experience to date indicates that collaborative law is a valuable dispute
resolution for those parties who choose to participate in it with informed
consent. Like other ADR processes, collaborative law reduces the costs of
dispute resolution for parties and emphasizes the importance of party selfdetermination. Collaborative law also has significant benefits to the public by
saving scarce judicial resources, in promoting peaceful, durable resolution of
disputes and a positive view of the civil justice system by participants and the
general public.
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Reducing the Costs of Divorce and Family Related Conflict for Parents and
Children
Problem-solving approaches to potential settlement are especially
appropriate in divorce and family disputes where economic, emotional, and
parental relationships often continue after the legal process ends. Dissolution
and reorganization of intimate relationships can generate intense anger, stress,
and anxiety, emotions which can be exacerbated by adversary litigation and
positional approaches to dispute resolution. The emotional and economic
futures of children and parents, who often have limited resources, are at stake in
family and divorce disputes. The needs of children are particularly implicated in
divorce cases, as children exposed to high levels of inter-parental conflict "are
at [a higher] risk for developing a range of emotional and behavioral problems,
both during childhood and later in life." John H. Grych, Interparental Conflict
as a Risk Factorfor Child Maladjustment: Implicationsfor the Development of
Prevention Programs, 43

FAM.

CT.

REv.

97,

97

(2005);

see also

INTERPARENTAL CONFLICT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH,

AND APPLICATIONS 157 (John H. Grych & Frank D. Fincham eds., 2001); Joan

B. Kelly, Children'sAdjustment in ConflictedMarriage and Divorce:A Decade
Review of Research, 39 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 963,

963-65 (2000). When conflict levels are low between parents, a child is more
likely to have contact with both parents and the child support is more regularly
See ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY:
INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 35 (2004) [hereinafter
paid.

SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY].

Parents in divorce and family disputes have negative reactions to litigation
as a method of resolving family problems. Id. at 42-44. Divorcing parents may
well thus rationally decide that their well-being and the well-being of their
children is better promoted by dispute resolution through collaborative law
rather than more traditional courtroom proceedings and adversarial oriented
positional negotiations. There are risks for parents who choose collaborative
law--especially of incurring the economic and emotional cost of employing a
new lawyer. But there are also benefits for them and their children.
[I]t would be a mistake to focus solely on the risks that [collaborative
law] poses for clients. Other things being equal, spouses who choose
court-based divorce presumably run the greater risk of harming
themselves and their children in bitter litigation or rancorous
negotiations. [Collaborative law] clients presumably bind themselves
by a mutual commitment to good faith negotiation in hopes of reducing
the risk that they will cause such harm, just as Ulysses had his crew tie
him to the mast so he would not succumb to the Sirens' call and have
his ship founder.
Schneyer, supra, at 318 n.142; see also SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND

CUSTODY, supra, at 50-51 (emphasizing the alternate dispute resolution process
as the best choice for litigants who will maintain a relationship after resolution);
Robert E. Emery et al., Divorce Mediation: Research and Reflections, 43 FAM.
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CT. REV. 22, 34 (2005) (stating parents' need to avoid becoming adversaries in
divorce, especially where children are involved).
Less Costly, More Durable Settlements of Conflict
More generally, society benefits when parties in any kind of dispute have
more options for dispute resolution. The more dispute resolution options
available to parties, the greater the likelihood that they will choose a process
that will resolve their matters short of trial, earlier in their life cycle, at less
economic and emotional cost, and with greater long range satisfaction. See AD
Hoc PANEL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION, NAT'L INST. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
PATHS TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION,
reprinted in LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE

RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 694, 695-96 (2d ed. 1997); Nancy H. Rogers &
Craig A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to
EncourageDirect and Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 831,
837-38 (1998).
Parties who participate in consensual dispute resolution processes like
collaborative law have a more positive view of the justice system. They

generally prefer consensual processes to resolution of disputes by court order,
even if they result in unfavorable outcomes. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER,
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 97 (1988). They see
consensual processes as subjectively fairer than adversarial dispute resolution.

Id. at 210. Consensual dispute also enhances the relationships underlying
conflict. Parties who participate in consensual dispute resolution feel a
commitment to the agreement they have come to and to the other party in the
conflict and are more likely to comply with that agreement as compared to one
imposed on them. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW

(1990).
Consensual dispute resolution gives parties the greatest opportunities for
participation in determining the outcome of the process, allows self-expression,
and encourages communication. Robert A. Baruch Bush, "What Do We Need a
Mediatorfor? ": Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON
DISP. RESOL. 1, 21 (1996). Parties value the self-determination inherent in

consensual dispute resolution, as they believe they know what is best for
themselves and want to be able to incorporate that understanding into the
settlement of their disputes. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection,

or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical
Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 267-68 (1989).
Earlier settlements can reduce the disruption that a dispute can cause in the
lives of parties and others affected by the dispute and reduce private and public
resources spent on the resolution of disputes. See, e.g., JEFFREY Z. RUBIN ET AL.,
SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 71, 99 (2d ed.

1994) (discussing reasons for and consequences of conflict escalation). When
settlement is reached earlier, personal and societal resources dedicated to
resolving disputes can be invested in more productive ways. Earlier settlement
also diminishes the unnecessary expenditure of personal and institutional
resources for conflict resolution, and promotes a more civil society. TEX. CIV.
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§ 154.002 (Vernon 2005) ("It is the policy of this

state to encourage the peaceable resolution of disputes . . . . and the early

settlement of pending litigation through voluntary settlement procedures."); see
also Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structuresfor the Delivery of ADR Services
by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 715,
725-26 (1999); Robert K. Wise, Mediation in Texas: Can the Judge Really
Make Me Do That?, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 849, 851-52 (2006). See generally
ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000) (discussing the causes for the decline of civic
engagement and ways of ameliorating the situation).
The Continued Role of Litigation in Dispute Resolution
Not all disputes can or should be resolved through negotiation and
compromise encouraged by collaborative law. Litigation and judicial
determinations serve vital social purposes. Courts articulate, apply, and expand
principals of law necessary to provide order to social and economic life.
Negotiations take place in the "shadow of the law" and precedents created by
litigation provide a framework to structure clients' expectations of reasonable
results. Courts resolve factual conflicts through the time tested procedures of the
adversary system and required by due process of law. Courts can require
disclosure of information that one side wants to keep from the other. Courts can
issue orders backed by sanctions that protect the vulnerable and weak. These
benefits of the judicial process are generally not available when settlements
occur through private, confidential processes such as collaborative law. See
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1084-85 (1984).
The benefits of court-imposed resolution of disputes through litigation are
not, however, without costs. Parties can find litigation to be emotionally and
economically draining. Judge Learned Hand, in his customarily succinct style,
summarized the consequences of adversary litigation for many by stating that
"as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit beyond almost anything else short of
sickness and death." Address of Learned Hand, in LECTURES ON LEGAL TOPICS,
1921-1922, 89, 105 (1926); see also Robert H. Heidt, When Plaintiffs Are
Premium Plannersfor Their Injuries: A Fresh Look at the Fireman'sRule, 82
IND. L.J. 745, 769 (2007) (applauding the fireman's rule for its curtailment of
"toxic and protracted" litigation and noting that "incessant wrangling . .. will
leave many professional rescuers and defendants dispirited" and may stretch on
for years, leaving the parties and witnesses bitter, stressed, and frustrated);
Jeffrey O'Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice Claims
Under A Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373,
420 (2002) (referring to Judge Learned Hand's quote while discussing the
benefit of "prompt settlement of personal injury tort claims, including those
arising from medical malpractice").
The overall goal for social policy is not to eliminate litigation. Rather, it is
to develop responsible alternatives to supplement litigation so that parties have
multiple options for dispute resolution. Parties can then decide for themselves if
the costs of litigation outweigh its benefits in their particular circumstances and
what alternative processes might best suit them. The greater the range of dispute
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resolution options that parties have for "'fit[ting] the forum to the fuss,"' the
better. Lande & Herman, supra,at 284 (citation omitted).
Collaborative Law and the Legal Profession
In addition to its benefits for parties and the public, collaborative law also
has benefits for the legal profession. It merges the venerable tradition of lawyer
as counselor with the bar's more recent successful experience with
representation of clients in ADR. Collaborative law provides professional
satisfaction for the lawyers who practice it. Collaborative law is especially well
suited to the emerging role of a lawyer as a problem solver for a party in a
divorce or family dispute. It is part of the trend towards unbundled or discrete
task legal representation. Bar Association ethics committees have concluded
that collaborative law is consistent with the rules of professional responsibility
governing lawyers, if entered into with informed client consent.
The Lawyer as Counselor
Lawyers have long and productively counseled clients to consider the
benefits of settlement and the costs of continued conflict. For example,
Abraham Lincoln in 1850 in his Notes for a Law Lecture advised young
lawyers:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a
real loser-in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker, the
lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still
be business enough.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, NOTES FOR A LAW LECTURE (1850[?]), in THE LIFE AND

WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 327, 328 (Philip Van Doren Stern ed., 1940).
The Bar has long formally recognized the lawyer's role as counselor articulated
by Lincoln in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Model Rule 2.1
provides that "[i]n rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that
may be relevant to the client's situation." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 2.1 (2009). Comment 2 to Model Rule 2.1 amplifies the sentiment by stating
that
[aldvice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a
client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects
on other people, are predominant. Purely technical legal advice,
therefore, can sometimes be inadequate. It is proper for a lawyer to
refer to relevant moral and ethical considerations in giving advice.
Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively
influence how the law will be applied.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. 2 (2009).
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The Special Role of the Family and Divorce Lawyer
The importance of the role of counselor and problem solver is especially
pronounced for lawyers who represent clients in divorce and family disputes
where collaborative law has had its greatest growth. Indeed, the divorce bar
recognizes that those disputes are particularly appropriate for the problemsolving orientation to client representation that collaborative law encourages.
Bounds of Advocacy, a supplementary code of standards of professional
responsibility for divorce law specialists who are members of the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers (AAML), states that: "[a]s a counselor, a
problem-solving lawyer encourages problem solving in the client.. . . The
client's best interests include the well-being of children, family peace, and
economic stability." AAML, Bounds of Advocacy: Preliminary Statement,
http://www.aaml.org/go/library/publications/bounds-of-advocacy/preliminarystatement/ (last visited May 25, 2010). Bounds of Advocacy further states that
"the emphasis on zealous representation [used] in criminal cases and some civil
cases is not always appropriate in family law matters" and that "[p]ublic
opinion ... increasingly support[s] other models of lawyering and goals of
conflict resolution in appropriate cases." Id. Furthermore,Bounds of Advocacy
states that a divorce lawyer should "consider the welfare of, and seek to
minimize the adverse impact of the divorce on, the minor children." AAML,
Bounds of Advocacy: Children, http://www.aaml.org/go/library/publications/
bounds-of-advocacy/6-children/ (last visited May 25, 2010).
Lawyers and Alternative Dispute Resolution
Collaborative law is also an outgrowth of the increasing number of lawyers
who had found clients benefit from the availability of and participation in ADR
processes such as mediation and arbitration. See MACFARLANE, NEW LAWYER,
supra, at 11.
The organized bar has generally encouraged the growth and development of
ADR processes and the involvement of lawyers in them. In 1976, 200 judges,
scholars, and leaders of the bar gathered at the Pound Conference convened by
the ABA to examine concerns about the efficiency and fairness of the court
systems and dissatisfaction with the administration of justice. Warren E. Burger,
Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83, 83
(1976). Then Chief Justice Warren Burger called for exploration of informal
dispute resolution processes. Id. at 93. The Pound Conference emphasized ADR
processes-particularly mediation-as better for litigants who had continuing
relationships after the trial was over because it emphasized their common
interests rather than those that divided them. See Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties
ofDispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 121, 127 (1976). Professor Frank Sander,
Reporter for the Pound Conference's follow-up task force, projected a powerful
vision of the court as not simply "a court house but a Dispute Resolution Center,
where the grievant would first be channeled through a screening clerk who
would then direct him to the process (or sequence of processes) most
appropriate to his type of case." Id. at 131.
Today, approximately forty years after the Pound Conference, ADR has
been fully integrated into the dispute resolution systems of most jurisdictions.
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See LexisNexis 50 State Comparative Legislation/Regulations: Alternative
Dispute Resolution (2008) (unpublished fifty-state survey) (on file with
Reporter). All fifty states have adopted ADR statutes or regulations, id,
including: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1806 (2004) (settling disputes by
arbitration for close corporations); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 465 (West 2007)
(establishing community dispute resolution programs); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-22-201 (West Supp. 2009) (court procedures for arbitration); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 455.2235 (West 2007) (mediation provisions for businesses and
professions); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.

§ 7.06.010 (West 2007) (mandatory

arbitration of civil actions).
In many states lawyers are required to present clients with ADR optionsmediation, expert evaluation, arbitration-in addition to litigation.
Professionalism creeds in Texas and Ohio, for example, require such discussion
between lawyers and clients. See SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, PROFESSIONAL
IDEALS FOR OHIO LAWYERS AND JUDGES 5 (2007) (highlighting the Lawyer's

Creed, which provides in part that a lawyer shall counsel his client "with respect
to alternative methods to resolve disputes."); SUPREME COURT OF TEX. COURT
OF CRIMINAL APPEALS,

THE TEXAS

LAWYER'S CREED: A MANDATE

FOR

PROFESSIONALISM § 11(11) (1989), available at http://www.texasbar.com/
Template.cfm?Section=pamphlets&CONTENTID=7227&TEMPLATE=/Conte
ntManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm ("I will advise my client regarding the
availability of mediation, arbitration, and other alternative methods of resolving
and settling disputes."). In other states, similar obligations are imposed on
lawyers by statute or court rule. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 16-7-204 (1999)
("All attorneys . . . are encouraged to advise their clients about the dispute

resolution process options available to them and to assist them in the selection
of the technique or procedure. . . ."); N.J. CT. R. 1:40-1 (giving attorneys the
responsibility to discuss alternative resolution procedures with their clients); see
also Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required to Advise a Client of
ADR Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, apps. I & 11 (2000) (providing a
comprehensive list of court rules, state statutes, and ethics provisions). See
generally Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The
Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L.
REV. 401 (2002) (discussing the Minnesota rule requiring ADR to be considered
in civil cases); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Challenge of
InstitutionalizingAlternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the
Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REV. 473 (2002)
(empirical studies analyzing the impact of rules requiring lawyers to discuss
ADR with clients).
Collaborative Law and "Unbundled" Legal Representation
Collaborative law is also part of the movement towards delivery of
"unbundled" or "discreet task" legal representation, as it separates by agreement
representation in settlement-oriented processes from representation in pretrial
litigation and the courtroom. By increasing the range of options for services that
lawyers can provide to clients, unbundled legal services reduces costs and
increases client satisfaction with the services provided. FORREST S. MOSTEN,
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UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES: A GUIDE TO DELIVERING LEGAL SERVICES A LA
CARTE 8-10 (2000) [hereinafter MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL SERVICES];

Franklin R. Garfield, Unbundling Legal Services in Mediation: Reflections of a
Family Lawyer, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 76, 85 (2002). The organized bar has
recognized unbundled services like collaborative law as a useful part of the
lawyer's representational options. See Forrest S. Mosten, Guest EditorialNotes,
40 FAM. CT. REV. 10, 10 (2002); see also MOSTEN, UNBUNDLING LEGAL
SERVICES, supra, at 1-12 (explaining unbundled legal representation, and
demonstrating ABA approval in this work). See generally Symposium, The
Changing Face of Legal Practice: Twenty-Six Recommendations from the
Baltimore Conference-A National Conference on 'Unbundled' Legal Services
October 2000, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 26 (2002) (summarizing the recommendations
of the conference on how to fit unbundled legal representation within the legalservices delivery system, the courts, the organized private bar, and the state
legislatures).
Collaborative Law and Ethics Opinions of Bar Associations
The trends in the legal profession described above-the importance of the
role of the lawyer as counselor, the importance of settlement and stability to
parents and children, the growth of representation of clients in ADR and in
unbundled legal representation-are reflected in the organized bar's positive
response to collaborative law. Numerous bar association ethics committees have
concluded collaborative law is generally consistent with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the obligations of lawyers to clients. See Ky. Bar
Ass'n, Ethics Op. E-425, 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.kybar.org/
documents/ethicsopinions/kba e-425.pdf; Advisory Comm. of the Supreme
Court of Mo., Formal Op. 124 (2008), available at www.mobar.org/
data/esq08/aug22/formal-opinion.htm; N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics,
Op. 699 (2005), available at http://1awlibrary.rutgers.edulethicsdecisions/
acpe/acp699_1.html; N.C. State Bar Ass'n, Formal Ethics Op. 1 (2002),
available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/printopinion.asp?id+641; Pa. Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Informal Op. 2004-24,
at 3-5 (2004), available at http://www.collaborativelaw.us/articles/Ethics_
OpinionPenn CL 2004.pdf. As one commentator has noted, "the mainstream
response [of the organized bar] has for the most part accepted [collaborative
law], at least as a worthwhile experiment." Schneyer, supra, at 292.
Only one state bar ethics opinion concluded to the contrary, arguing that
when collaborative lawyers sign a collaborative law participation agreement
with parties, they assume contractual duties to other parties besides their client,
creating an intolerable conflict of interest. Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar
Ass'n, Ethics Op. 115 (2007), available at http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/
386/sublD/10159/CETH/Ethics-Opinion- 115:-Ethical-Considerations-in-theCollaborative-and-Cooperative-Law-Contexts,-02/24//.
Even that opinion,
however, recognized that collaborative law was permissible if an agreement is
between clients only, without the agreement of the lawyers. Id. Furthermore,
Colorado's unique view has been specifically rejected by the ABA. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-447, at 3 (2007).
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The ABA opinion concluded that collaborative law is a "permissible limited
scope representation," the disqualification provision is "not an agreement that
impairs [the lawyer's] ability to represent the client, but rather is consistent with
the client's limited goals for the representation," and "[i]f the client has given
his or her informed consent, the lawyer may represent the client in the
collaborative law process." Id. at 1, 3-4.
The Satisfactions of Service for Collaborative Lawyers
Some are more suited to the courtroom while others are more suited to the
conference room. As a result, not all lawyers will practice collaborative law.
The growth of collaborative law has an intangible benefit, however, for the
lawyers who practice it-greater satisfaction in the profession they have chosen.
Susan Daicoff, Lawyer, Be Thyself An Empirical Investigation of the
Relationship Between the Ethic of Care, the Feeling Decisionmaking
Preference,and Lawyer Wellbeing, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 87, 133 (2008).
Collaborative lawyers generally feel that the collaborative law process enables
them to work productively with other professions in service to parties. See Janet
Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary
Education in Law Practice,74 WASH. L. REv. 319, 337-38 (1999). Instead of
using these professionals in an adversarial framework as expert witnesses or
consultants to further their "case," collaborative lawyers draw on their expertise
to help shape creative negotiations and settlements. Elizabeth Tobin Tyler,
Allies Not Adversaries: Teaching Collaboration to the Next Generation of
Doctors and Lawyers to Address Social Inequality, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL'Y 249, 271-72 (2008).

More globally, collaborative lawyers feel they help their clients resolve
their disputes productively, thus fulfilling Lincoln's inspirational vision of the
lawyer "[a]s a peacemaker" with the "superior opportunity of being a good man
[or woman]" for whom "[t]here will still be business enough." LINCOLN, supra,
at 328. The professional satisfaction of the collaborative lawyer's role may have
best been summed up nearly one hundred years after Lincoln wrote by another
great figure who was also a practicing lawyer, Mohandas Gandhi. Gandhi
served as a lawyer for the South African Indian community before he returned
to India to lead its fight for independence. Reflecting on his experience
encouraging a settlement by a client of a commercial dispute, Gandhi wrote:
My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt
to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I
realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven
asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of
my time during the twenty years of my practice as a lawyer was
occupied in bringing about private compromises of hundreds of cases. I
lost nothing thereby-not even money, certainly not my soul.
M.K. GANDHI, GANDHI'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY: THE STORY
WITH TRUTH 168 (Mahadev Desai trans., 1960).
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The Uniform Collaborative Law Act-An Overview
The overall goal of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act is to encourage the
continued development and growth of collaborative law as a voluntary dispute
resolution option. Collaborative law has thus far largely been practiced under
the auspices of private collaborative law participation agreements developed by
private practice groups. These agreements vary substantially in depth and detail,
and their enforcement must be accomplished by actions for breach of contract.
The Uniform Collaborative Law Act aims to standardize the most important
features of collaborative law participation agreements, both to protect
consumers and to facilitate party entry into a collaborative law process. It
mandates essential elements of a process of disclosure and discussion between
prospective collaborative lawyers and prospective parties to better insure that
parties who sign participation agreements do so with informed consent. It
requires collaborative lawyers to make reasonable inquiries and take steps to
protect parties against the trauma of domestic violence. The act also makes
collaborative law's key features-especially the disqualification provision and
voluntary disclosure of information provision-mandated provisions of
participation agreements that seek the benefits of the rights and obligations of
the act. Finally, the act creates an evidentiary privilege for collaborative law
communications to facilitate candid discussions during the collaborative law
process.
Specifically, the Uniform Collaborative Law Act:
* applies only to collaborative law participation agreements that meet the
requirements of the act, thus seeking to insure that parties do not
inadvertently enter into a collaborative law process (section 3);
* establishes minimum requirements for collaborative law participation
agreements, including written agreements that state the parties'
intention to resolve their matter (collaborative matter) through a
collaborative law process under the act, include a description of the
matter submitted to a collaborative law process, and designation of
collaborative lawyers (section 4);
* emphasizes that party participation in collaborative law is voluntary by
prohibiting tribunals from ordering a party into a collaborative law
process over that party's objection (section 5 (b));
* specifies when and how a collaborative law process begins and is
concluded (section 5);
* creates a stay of proceedings when parties sign a participation
agreement to attempt to resolve a matter related to a proceeding
pending before a tribunal while allowing the tribunal to ask' for
periodic status reports (section 6);
* makes an exception to the stay of proceedings for emergency orders to
protect health, safety, welfare or interests of a party, a family member
or a dependent (section 7);
* authorizes tribunals to approve settlements arising out of a
collaborative law process (section 8);
* codifies the disqualification requirement for collaborative lawyers
when a collaborative law process concludes (section 9);
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defines the scope of the disqualification requirement to include both
the collaborative matter and a matter "related to the collaborative
matter" (section 9)-those involving the "same parties, transaction or
occurrence, nucleus of operative fact, dispute, claim, or issue as the
collaborative matter" (section 2(13));
extends the disqualification requirement beyond the individual
collaborative lawyer to lawyers in a law firm with which the
collaborative lawyer is associated (imputed disqualification) (section
9(b));
relaxes imputed disqualification if the firm represents low-income
parties for no fee, the parties agree to the exception in advance in their
collaborative law participation agreement, and the original
collaborative lawyer is screened from further participation in the matter
or related matters (section 10(b));
creates a similar exception for collaborative lawyers for government
agencies (section 11(b));
requires parties to voluntarily disclose relevant information during the
collaborative law process without formal discovery requests and update
information previously disclosed that has materially changed; the
parties may also agree on the scope of disclosure required during a
collaborative law process if that scope is not inconsistent with other
law (section 12);
acknowledges that standards of professional responsibility and child
abuse reporting for lawyers and other professionals are not changed by
their participation in a collaborative law process (section 13);
requires that lawyers disclose and discuss the material risks and
benefits of a collaborative law process as compared to other dispute
resolution processes such as litigation, mediation, and arbitration to
help insure parties enter into collaborative law participation agreements
with informed consent (section 14(2));
creates an obligation on collaborative lawyers to screen clients for
domestic violence (defined as a "coercive or violent relationship") and,
if present, to participate in a collaborative law process only if the
victim consents and the lawyer reasonably believes that the victim will
be safe (section 15);
authorizes parties to reach an agreement on the scope of confidentiality
of their collaborative law communications (section 16);
creates an evidentiary privilege for collaborative law communications
which are sought to be introduced into evidence before a tribunal
(section 17);
provides for possibility of waiver of and limited exceptions to the
evidentiary privilege based on important countervailing public policies
(such as the protection of bodily integrity and crime prevention) similar
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to those recognized for mediation communications in the Uniform
Mediation Act (sections 18-19)*;
authorizes tribunal discretion to enforce agreements that result from a
collaborative law process, the disqualification requirement and the
evidentiary privilege provisions of the act, despite the lawyers'
mistakes in required disclosures before collaborative law participation
agreements are executed and in the written participation agreements
themselves (section 20).

Key Policy Issues Addressed in the Drafting of the Uniform Collaborative
Law Act
The Balance Between Regulation and Party Autonomy
The Uniform Collaborative Law Act supports a trend that emphasizes client
autonomy and "greater reliance on governance of lawyer-client relationship by
contract." Schneyer, supra, at 318. The act's philosophy is to set a standard
minimum floor for collaborative law participation agreements to inform and
protect prospective parties and make a collaborative law process easier to
administer. Beyond minimum requirements, however, the act leaves the
collaborative law process to agreement between parties and collaborative
lawyers.
The act's regulatory philosophy encourages parties and their collaborative
lawyers to design a collaborative law process through contract that best satisfies
their needs and economic circumstances. Parties can add additional provisions
to their agreements which are not inconsistent with the core features of
collaborative law (section 4(b)): the disqualification requirement (sections 911); voluntary disclosure of information (section 12); informed consent (section
14); protection of safety from domestic violence (section 15); and a party's right
to terminate a collaborative law process without cause (section 5(f)). The act's
regulatory philosophy is similar to the regulatory philosophy that animates the
Uniform Arbitration Act:
Arbitration is a consensual process in which autonomy of the parties
who enter into arbitration agreements should be given primary
consideration, so long as their agreements conform to notions of
fundamental fairness. This approach provides parties with the
* The Drafting Committee for the Uniform Collaborative Law Act gratefully acknowledges
a major debt to the drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act. The drafting of the Uniform Mediation
Act required the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (now the Uniform
Law Commission) to comprehensively examine a dispute resolution process serving many of the
same goals as collaborative law, and ask what a statute could do to facilitate the growth and
development of that process. Many of the issues involved in the drafting of the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act, particularly those involving the scope of evidentiary privilege, are virtually
identical to those that had to be resolved in the drafting of the Uniform Mediation Act. As a result,
some of the provisions, the commentary and citations in this act are taken verbatim or with slight
adaptation from the Uniform Mediation Act. To reduce confusion, those provisions are presented
here without quotation marks or citations, and edited for brevity and with insertions to make them
applicable to collaborative law.
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opportunity in most instances to shape the arbitration process to their
own particular needs.
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT Prefatory Note (2000).

As previously described, collaborative law can be practiced following many
different models. There are many varieties of participation agreements-some
short, some long, some in legalese, and some in plain language. Some models of
collaborative law do not require the parties to hire any additional experts to play
any role. In other models, collaborative law involves many professionals (e.g.,
mental health and financial planners) from other disciplines, see LA. DIST. CT.
R. tit. IV, ch. 39, R. 39.0; in others, it does not. See CONTRA COSTA, CAL.,
LOCAL CT. R. 12.5. In some models of collaborative law, mental health
professionals play roles such as "divorce coach" and "child specialist." Pauline
H. Tesler, CollaborativeFamily Law, the New Lawyer, and Deep Resolution of
Divorce-Related Conflicts, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 83, 92 n.23, 93 n.24. Neutral
experts can be engaged by the parties to do a specific task such as an appraisal
or valuation or evaluation of parenting issues. Id. at 93 n.25. Some models of
collaborative law encourage parties and collaborative lawyers to mediate
disputes and call in a third party neutral for that purpose. Id at 92.
In the interests of stimulating diversity and continuing experimentation in
collaborative law, the act does not regulate in detail how collaborative law
should be practiced. Each model of collaborative law has different benefits and
costs, as do different models of mediation or arbitration. See Roger S. Haydock
& Jennifer D. Henderson, Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An American
Historical Review and a Proposalfor a Private/Arbitraland Public/Judicial
Partnership, 2 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 141, 189-91 (2002). See generally
Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (2000) (discussing the evolution from the
"folklore arbitration model" to the "contract model" of arbitration); Leonard L.
Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New
Grid System, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2003) (discussing the uses and
problems of the "old grid" system of mediation and the "new grid" system of
mediation). A dispute resolution process which involves more professionals
will, for example, cost parties more than one which does not. It will also give
parties the benefit of access to the expertise of mental health professionals and
financial planners. There is no particular public policy reason a statute should
prefer one model of collaborative practice over another, as opposed to
promoting the development of collaborative law generally as a dispute
resolution option. It will be up to parties, collaborative lawyers, and the
marketplace to determine what model of practice best meets party needs.
Legislation and Professional Responsibility Obligations of Lawyers
As previously discussed, bar association ethics opinions-including one
from the ABA-have concluded that collaborative lawyers are bound by the
same rules of ethics as other lawyers and that the practice of collaborative law is
consistent with those rules. See supra pp. 441-42. To avoid any possible
confusion, section 13 of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act explicitly states the
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act does not change the professional responsibility obligations of collaborative
lawyers.
Indeed, any attempt to change the professional responsibility obligations of
lawyers by legislation would raise separation of powers concerns, as that power
is in some states reserved to the judiciary. Attorney Gen. v. Waldron, 426 A.2d
929, 932 (Md. 1981) (striking down as unconstitutional a statute that in the
court's view was designed to "prescrib[e] for certain otherwise qualified
practitioners additional prerequisites to the continued pursuit of their chosen
vocation"); Wisconsin ex rel. Fiedler v. Wis. Senate, 454 N.W.2d 770, 772
(Wis. 1990) (concluding that the state legislature may share authority with the
judiciary to set forth minimum requirements regarding persons' eligibility to
enter the bar, but the judiciary ultimately has the authority to regulate training
requirements for those admitted to practice). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 1 cmt. c (2000).

It is also important to note that the favorable bar association opinions and
the act do not validate every form of collaborative law agreement or
collaborative law practice. This still leaves collaborative lawyers and
collaborative law participation agreements subject to regulation by bar ethics
committees and other agencies charged with regulating lawyers and to
malpractice claims by clients. Particular collaborative law participation
agreements, for example, may have provisions which raise professional
responsibility concerns. The act does not require that lawyers sign the
collaborative law participation agreement as parties, a practice common in the
collaborative law community; rather, it requires only that parties identify their
collaborative lawyers in participation agreements and that the lawyer sign a
statement confirming the lawyer's representation of a client in collaborative
law. See infra § 4(a)(6). Depending on the language and structure of a
participation agreement, a lawyer who signs it may assume duties to another
party to the agreement-a person with conflicting interests other than his or her
client-a result that could raise ethics concerns. Scott R. Peppet, The (New)
Ethics of CollaborativeLaw, 14 Disp. RESOL. MAG. 23, 24-26 (2008). The act
leaves questions raised by particular language and form in collaborative law
participation agreements to regulation by the same sources of authority that
regulate all lawyer conduct such as ethics committees. Furthermore, to the
extent that a collaborative law participation agreement is also a lawyer-client
limited retainer agreement, it must meet whatever requirements are set by state
law for lawyer-client retainer agreements. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 22, § 202.16(c) (1986) (governing the lawyer-client relationship in
matrimonial matters, including requirement of written retainer agreement).
The Need for Legal Representation in Collaborative Law
Under the act, parties can sign a collaborative law participation agreement
only if they engage a collaborative lawyer. Collaborative law is not an option
for the self-represented.
The requirement that parties be represented differentiates collaborative law
from other ADR processes. Generally, self-represented litigants are allowed to
participate in arbitration. See UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 16 (2000) ("A party to
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an arbitration proceeding may be represented by a lawyer." (emphasis added)).
Several federal and state courts allow self-represented litigants in arbitration.
See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, PRO SE HANDBOOK: THE
MANUAL FOR THE LITIGANT FILING WITHOUT COUNSEL 4, 11 (1995), available

at http://www.id.uscourts.gov/docs/pro-se.pdf; U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E.
DIST.

OF

TENN.,

VOLUNTARY

ARBITRATION

5

(2000),

available at

http://www.tned.uscourts.gov/docs/medarb/arbhbook.pdf; Alternative Dispute
Resolution, Arbitrator's Handbook to Compulsory Arbitration in the Delaware
Superior Court, http://courts.state.de.us/Courts/Superior/ 20Court/ADR/ADR/
adr compulsory arbitration.htm#b2 (last visited May 25, 2010). However,
some states and arbitration programs have taken the opposite view. See, e.g.,
U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Arbitration FAQ, http://www.nyed.
uscourts.gov/adr/Arbitration/ArbitrationFAQ/arbitration faq.html (last visited
May 25, 2010). Similarly, self-represented litigants are generally allowed to
participate in mediation. The drafting committee of the Uniform Mediation Act
elected to let the parties decide whether to bring counsel into mediation. UNIF.
MEDIATION ACT § 10 cmt., 7A U.L.A. 146 (2006). State statutes differ on
whether a mediator is empowered to exclude lawyers from mediation. See, e.g.,
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3182 (West 2004) (mediator has authority to exclude
counsel); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-05 (2004) (mediator may not exclude
counsel); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-59 (2004) (mediator may exclude
counsel).
An individual's statutory right to self-representation in court was initially
recognized by the Judiciary Act of 1789. TASK FORCE ON PRO SE LITIGATION,
GUIDELINES FOR BEST PRACTICES IN PRO SE ASSISTANCE 9 (2004), availableat

http://www.lasc.org/la judicialentities/JudicialCouncil/ProSeGuidelines.pdf
(setting forth the best national and local practices that may be used by district
court judges to provide assistance to pro se litigants). It was later codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) ("In all courts of the United States the parties may plead
and conduct their own cases personally . . . ."). Additionally, the constitution or
statutes of many states either expressly or by interpretation provide for the right
to self-representation in court. See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE

CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES
AND COURT MANAGERS app. III at 130-34 (1998), available at
http://contentdm.ncsconline.org/cgi-bin/showfile.exe?CISOROOT=/accessfair&
CISOPTR=106.
Collaborative law is, however, a private, contractual agreement between
parties to attempt to resolve disputes out of court. Parties may be required to
agree to waive their right to self representation as a condition for participating in
collaborative law and getting its benefits, but they must do so with informed
consent and be aware of the risks and benefits of their decision. See Richard C.
Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory of Alternative Dispute
Resolution andPublic Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 1081-82 (2000).
Practical considerations also require limiting collaborative law to parties
who are represented by counsel. If self-represented parties participated in
collaborative law, especially if only one side were in this category, there would
be a high potential for role confusion. Both parties might look to the single
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lawyer for an assessment of their rights or relative weakness or strength of their
case without the protection of advice from their own counsel. The individual
collaborative lawyer would be placed in a difficult situation and would have to
structure what he or she says to the unrepresented party carefully. See Ass'n of
the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof I and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op.
2009-2 (2009), available at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth2009-2.htm
(describing standards for what a lawyer can and cannot say to an unrepresented
party, and imposing a duty to explain rules to an unrepresented party). A selfrepresented party in collaborative law would have neither a neutral nor an
advocate to help balance what might be a great difference in knowledge, power,
or resources between the parties. Thus, a self-represented party runs a great risk
of impairing his or her case and being manipulated in collaborative law
negotiations. Additionally, agreements to participate in a collaborative law
process and consent to agreements that result from the process may not be truly
informed without counsel.
Education and Training Requirements for Collaborative Lawyers
At present, each collaborative law practice group sets its own qualifications
and training standards for membership, which can be quite extensive. See, e.g.,
Collaborative Family Law Group of San Diego, Training for Collaborative
Divorce Professionals, Bylaws § 2.02, http://www.collaborativefamilylaw
sandiego.com/training.htm (last visited May 25, 2010) (requiring attorneys to be
licensed in California and have at least five years experience in the field of
family law, in addition to the other requirements of the association, including
completing a two-day training program, attending at least half of the CLE
programs offered by the association every year as well as the association's
general meetings, and maintaining membership in the IACP); Massachusetts
Collaborative Law Council, Membership Standards for Collaborative
Practitioners 1 (2006), http://www.massclc.org/pdf/2006STANDARDSFOR
PROFESSIONALS.pdf (last visited May 25, 2010) (requiring attorneys be
licensed and in good standing, have professional liability insurance, be current
in payment of council membership dues, and have twelve hours of basic
collaborative law training that meets IACP minimum standards); N.Y. Ass'n of
Collaborative Prof'ls, Joining the New York Association of Collaborative
Professionals,
http://www.collaborativelawny.com/join.php#Lawyer
(last
visited May 25, 2010) (requiring that attorneys be a member in good standing of
the New York State Bar with professional liability insurance, have five years of
matrimonial experience, and participate in two-day collaborative law training,
thirty-six to forty hours of mediation training, and attend seven meetings during
the year; the association also requires continuing training after the first year of
membership, ranging between eight to twelve hours).
For fear of raising separation of powers concerns previously discussed,
however, the act does not prescribe special qualifications and training for
collaborative lawyers or other professionals who participate in the collaborative
law process. The act's decision against prescribing qualifications and training
for collaborative law practitioners should not be interpreted as a disregard for
their importance. The act anticipates that collaborative lawyers and affiliated
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professionals will continue to form and participate in voluntary associations of
collaborative professionals who can prescribe standards of practice and training
for their members. Many such private associations already exist and their future
growth and development after passage of the act is foreseeable and encouraged.
Subject Matter Limitations and Divorce and Family Disputes
While collaborative law has, thus far, found its greatest acceptance in
divorce and family disputes, the act does not restrict the availability of
collaborative law to those subjects. Under it, collaborative law participation
agreements can be entered into to attempt to resolve everything from contractorsubcontractor disagreements, estate disputes, employer-employee rights,
statutory based claims, customer-vendor disagreements, or any other matter.
The act leaves the decision whether to use collaborative law to resolve any
matter to the parties with the advice of lawyers, not to a statutory subject matter
restriction which will be difficult to enforce and controversial to draft.
One reason not to limit collaborative law to "divorce and family disputes or
matters" is that the act would have to define those terms, a daunting task in light
of rapid changes in the field. Should the act, for example, allow or not allow a
collaborative law process in disputes arising from civil unions? Domestic
partnerships? Adoptions? Premarital agreements? Assisted reproductive
technologies? International child custody matters? Unmarried but romantically
linked business partners? Inheritances? Family trusts and businesses? Child
abuse and neglect? Foster care review? Elder abuse? Family related issues cut
across many old and emerging categories of fields of law and disputes difficult
to define in a statute.
More generally, there is no particular policy reason to restrict party
autonomy to choose collaborative law to a particular class of dispute, as parties
with a matter in any field could potentially find collaborative law a useful
option. Hopefully, over time, as collaborative law becomes more established
and visible, more parties with matters in areas other than family and divorce
disputes will come to understand its benefits and invoke the benefits and
protections of the act.
Collaborative law is a voluntary dispute resolution option for parties
represented by lawyers. The act requires that a lawyer help insure informed
consent of the benefits and burdens of a collaborative law process before a party
signs a participation agreement. A party's representation by a lawyer is a check
against an improvident agreement. No one is or can be compelled to enter into a
collaborative law process or agree to anything during it. A party can terminate
collaborative law at any time and for any reason.
Collaborative Law in Pending Cases
The purpose of the act is to provide parties an additional option to consider
for resolving a matter without judicial intervention. That purpose is furthered
even if parties choose collaborative law after a case is commenced in court.
Every pending case that is settled without a trial conserves party and public
resources for other matters. Section 6(a) thus authorizes parties to a proceeding
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before a tribunal-usually an action in court-to sign a collaborative law
participation agreement.
Notice to the tribunal that a collaborative law participation agreement has
been signed stays further proceedings, except for status reports. See infra § 6(a),
(c). The stay is lifted when the collaborative law process concludes. See infra
§ 6(b). Section 7 also explicitly creates an exception to the stay of proceedings
for "emergency orders to protect the health, safety, welfare, or interest of a
party" or family or household member. In addition, Section 8 authorizes
tribunals to approve settlements entered into as a result of a collaborative law
process. These provisions are based on court rules and statutes recognizing
collaborative law in a number of jurisdictions. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013
(West Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-71,-73 to -75 (2007); TEX. FAM.
CODE § 6.603 (Vernon 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE § 153.0072 (Vernon 2006);
CAL. CONTRA COSTA LOCAL CT. R. 12.5; CAL. L.A. COUNTY LOCAL CT. R.
14.26; CAL. S.F. COUNTY LOCAL CT. R. 11.17; CAL. SONOMA COUNTY LOCAL
CT. R. 9.26; LA. DIST. CT. R. R. 39.0; MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 111.05 (2008);
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 304.05 (2008); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-510(l)(D) (2009);
In re Domestic Relations-Collaborative Conflict Resolution in Dissolution of
Marriage Cases, Fla. Admin. Order No. 07-20-B (June 25, 2007).
The Scope of the Disqualification Requirement
"The disqualification requirement for collaborative lawyers after
collaborative law concludes is a fundamental defining characteristic of
collaborative law." See infra § 9 cmt. The economic incentives that the
disqualification requirement creates for settlement will be defeated if the
disqualification requirement is easily circumvented by collaborative lawyers or
by referrals to other lawyers from which the collaborative lawyer profits. Thus,
section 9 extends the requirement to not only the collaborative matter but also to
matters "related to a collaborative matter." In addition, the act prohibits lawyers
affiliated with a collaborative lawyer from continuing representation of a party
(imputed disqualification), thus reducing further the chances of circumventing
the disqualification requirement.
Matters "Related to" a Collaborative Matter
Section 9 extends the disqualification requirement beyond the matter
described in the participation agreement to matters that are "related" to the
"collaborative matter." "Related to [the] collaborative matter," in turn, is
defined in section 2(13) as "involving the same parties, transaction or
occurrence, nucleus of operative fact, dispute, claim, or issue as the
collaborative matter." The policy behind these definitions is to prevent the
collaborative lawyer from representing a party in court, for example, in an
enforcement action resulting from a divorce judgment if the divorce itself was
the subject of a completed collaborative law process between the same parties.
The definition of "related to" draws upon the elements of a compulsory
counterclaim as defined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a)(1) and the
definition of supplemental jurisdiction for the federal courts found in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) (2006). The act thus adopts a broad approach to what is "related to a
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collaborative matter" intended to emphasize that in cases of doubt the
disqualification provision should be applied more broadly than narrowly. See,
e.g., Abraham Natural Foods Corp. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 576 F. Supp.
2d 421, 424 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
Application of "related to a collaborative matter" will ultimately turn on a
case-by-case analysis of the purportedly related matter and its relationship to the
collaborative matter. Key issues that will be useful in making the decision will
include: whether the related matter involves the same or related or different
parties; the time elapsed between the matters; whether the matters involve the
same or related issues; whether the claims arise from the same transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; and whether the wrongs
complained of and redress sought, theory of recovery, evidence, and material
facts alleged are the same in both matters.
Imputed Disqualification of Associated Lawyers
Section 9(b) adapts the rule of "imputed disqualification" by extending the
disqualification requirement to lawyers in a law firm with which the
collaborative lawyer is associated in addition to the lawyer him or herself. The
policy behind the imputed disqualification requirement is to prevent the
collaborative lawyer from indirectly profiting from the continued representation
by an affiliated lawyer when the original collaborative lawyer agreed to assume
the economic burden of the disqualification requirement. Under Section 9(b), a
litigator in a law firm with which the collaborative lawyer is associated could
not, for example, represent the same party in litigation related to the matter if
collaborative law concludes.
This rule of imputed disqualification is supported by the basic principle of
professional responsibility that "[w]hile lawyers are associated in a firm, none
of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them practicing
alone would be prohibited from doing so... ." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L

CONDUCT R. 1.10(a) (2009). The comment to this Rule states:
The rule of imputed disqualification stated in paragraph (a) gives effect
to the principle of loyalty to the client as it applies to lawyers who
practice in a law firm. Such situations can be considered from the
premise that a firm of lawyers is essentially one lawyer for purposes of
the rules governing loyalty to the client, or from the premise that each
lawyer is vicariously bound by the obligation of loyalty owed by each
lawyer with whom the lawyer is associated."
Id. R. 1.10 cmt. 2.
Exception to Imputed Disqualification for Low-Income Parties
Section 10 modifies the imputed disqualification rule for lawyers in law
firms with which the collaborative lawyer is associated which represents a very
low-income client without fee. The goal of this section is to allow the legal aid
office, law firm, law school clinic, or the private firm doing pro bono work to
continue to represent the party in the matter if collaborative law concludes.
Section 10 only applies to parties with "an annual income that qualifies the
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party for free legal representation under the criteria established by the law firm
for free legal representation." See infra § 10(b)(1). Many legal aid offices, for
example, use 125% of federal poverty guidelines as a general eligibility
criterion. See Legal Aid of Neb., FAQ, http://www.nebls.com/FAQLAN (last
visited May 25, 2010); Legal Aid Soc'y of New York City, Frequently Asked
Questions about the Legal Aid Society, http://www.legal-aid.org/en/aboutus/
legalaidsocietyfaq.aspx (last visited May 25, 2010).
The conditions for such continued representation are that all parties to the
collaborative law participation agreement consent to this departure from the
imputed disqualification rule in advance. See infra § 10(b)(2). In addition, the
collaborative lawyer must be screened from further participation in the
collaborative matter and matters related to the collaborative matter. See infra
§ 10(b)(3).
The exception to the imputed disqualification rule in section 10 is based on
the recognition that "[a]t least 80 percent of low-income Americans who need
civil legal assistance do not receive any. . . ." Evelyn Nieves, 80% of PoorLack

Civil Legal Aid, Study Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2005, at A9. Legal aid
programs reject approximately one million cases per year for lack of resources
to handle them, a figure which does not include those who did not attempt to get
legal help. Id.; LEGAL SERV. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN

AMERICA 5 (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.1sc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf. The
Legal Services Corporation recently did a study about the lack of civil legal
services for low-income Americans. The results show that only one-fifth or less
of the legal problems experienced by low-income people are helped by either
pro bono or paid legal aid attorneys and only half of those who seek help will
actually get legal help. LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra, at 4. In 2002, there was one
private attorney to every 525 people from the general population. Id. at 15. In
that same year, there was only one legal aid attorney to every 6,861 people in
poverty. Id.
The need for civil legal representation for low-income people is particularly
acute in family law disputes. Recent studies have found that almost seventy
percent of family law litigants do not have a lawyer on either side of a
proceeding when the proceeding is filed in court, and the percentage increases
to eighty percent by the time the matter is final. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., STATEWIDE ACTION
LITIGANTS 11, available at
PLAN FOR SERVING SELF-REPRESENTED

http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/Full Report.pdf. Forty-nine
percent of petitioners and eighty-one percent of respondents were selfrepresented in Utah divorce cases in 2005. COMM. ON RES. FOR SELFREPRESENTED PARTIES, STRATEGIC PLANNING INITIATIVE: REPORT TO THE

JUDICIAL COUNCIL 5 (2006), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/

reports/Self/2ORepresented%2OLitigants%20Strategic%20Plan%202006.pdf.
Low-income clients thus already face great difficulty in securing
representation. They would face especially harsh consequences if collaborative
law terminates without agreement and virtually all lawyers who might continue
their representation are disqualified from doing so by imputed disqualification.
For most other parties, the disqualification requirement imposes a hardship, but
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they at least have the financial resources to engage new counsel. Low-income
clients, however, are unlikely to obtain a new lawyer from any other source.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct make a similar accommodation
to the needs of low-income parties by exempting non-profit and court-annexed
limited legal services programs from the imputed disqualification rule
applicable to for-profit firms. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2009).
The relaxation of the imputed disqualification rule for low-income clients of
section 10 will, hopefully, encourage legal aid offices, law school clinical
programs and private law firms who represent the poor through pro bono
programs to incorporate collaborative law into their practice.
Exception to Imputed Disqualification for Government Parties
Section 11 of the act creates an exception to imputed disqualification
similar to that in section 10 for lawyers in a law firm with which a collaborative
lawyer is associated which represents government parties. The act's definition
of "law firm" includes "the legal department of a government or government
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality." See infra § 2(6).
Section 11 is based on the policy that taxpayers should not run the risk of
the government having to pay for private outside counsel if collaborative law
terminates because all the lawyers in the agency are disqualified from further
representation. The conditions for the continued representation are advance
consent of all parties to the continued representation and the screening of the
individual collaborative lawyer from further participation in it and related
matters. See infra § 11(b).
The policy behind Section 11 is supported by Rule 1.11 of the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, which creates an exception to the general rule of
imputed disqualification for government lawyers "[b]ecause of the special
problems raised by imputation within a government agency," although
"ordinarily it will be prudent to screen such lawyers." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.11 cmt. 2 (2009). Courts also are willing to recognize screening
of individual attorneys for government agencies as a desirable alternative to a
wholesale disqualification of an entire agency. See, e.g., United States v. Goot,
894 F.2d 231, 235-37 (7th Cir. 1990) (not allowing the disqualification of the
U.S. Attorney's Office when a screen was in place for the head of the office
who was previously the defendant's attorney); see also United States v.
Caggiano, 660 F.2d 184, 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1981) (denying disqualification of
federal prosecutor's office even though a new assistant prosecutor had
previously represented the accused, when individual attorney was not assigned
to present matter).
Voluntary Disclosure of Information in Collaborative Law
"Except as provided by law other than this act," section 12 requires parties
to a collaborative law participation agreement to "make timely, full, candid, and
informal disclosure of information related to the collaborative matter without
formal discovery." It also requires parties to "update promptly previously
disclosed information that has materially changed." See infra § 12. Finally,
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section 12 authorizes parties to "define the scope of disclosure during the
collaborative law process."
Voluntary disclosure of information is a hallmark of collaborative law.
Participation in ADR processes like collaborative law typically does not include
the authority to compel one party to provide information to another. Jack M.
Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite ". Procedural and Evidentiary Norms
Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1314
(1998). A collaborative law participation agreement typically requires timely,
full, candid and informal disclosure of information related to the collaborative
matter. Strickland, supra, at 984-85. Voluntary disclosure helps to build trust
between the parties, a crucial prerequisite to a successful resolution of the
collaborative matter. PAULINE TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING
EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION 98-99 (2001). It is

also less expensive than formal discovery. Douglas C. Reynolds & Doris F.
Tennant, CollaborativeLaw-An Emerging Practice,BOSTON B. J., Nov.-Dec.
2001, at 12, 12. Similar requirements have been established for parties in
mediation. See, e.g., GA. SUP. CT. ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION R. app.

C, ch. 1(A)(I)(A)(7), available at http://www.godr.org/pdfs/CURRENTADR
RULESCOMPLETE9-8-09.pdf (referring to the expectation of parties who
participate in mediation "to negotiate in an atmosphere of good faith and full
disclosure of matters material to any agreement reached").
The obligation of voluntary disclosure imposed by Section 12 on parties to
a collaborative law process reflects a trend in civil litigation to encourage
voluntary disclosure without formal discovery requests early in a matter in the
hope of encouraging careful assessment and settlement. The Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, for example, requires that a party to litigation disclose names
of witnesses, documents, and computation of damages "without awaiting a
discovery request." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A). These early automatic
disclosures were based on a consensus by an advisory committee which drafted
the rule that the adversarial discovery process for obtaining information had
proven to be unduly time consuming and expensive. See generally FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(a) advisory committee's note (1993).
Like section 12, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also require parties to
supplement or correct a discovery response without request of the other side if
"the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure or response is
incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not
otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or
in writing." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(1)(A); see also Argusea LDC v. United States,
622 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1327-28 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (concluding that a party is not
bound by original answer to interrogatories if properly supplemented under
26(e)(1)(A)); Inline Connection Corp. v. AOL Time Warner Inc., 472 F. Supp.
2d 604, 612 (D. Del. 2007) (stating that an expert report that is not properly
amended under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2) is not admissible evidence in court,
unless the error was harmless). Many states impose similar obligations on
parties. See, e.g., R.I. SUP. CT. R. CIv. P. 26(e) (stating that a party has a duty to
supplement a response to discovery with information gained after the initial
response).
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The act does not specify sanctions for a party who does not comply with the
requirements of section 12. The drafters felt that any attempt to do so would
require the act to define "bad faith" failure to disclose. The result would be the
opposite of what the act seeks to encourage-more resolution of disputes
without resort to the courts. Courts would have to hold contested hearings on
whether party conduct met its definition of bad faith failure to disclose before
awarding sanctions. Such adversarial contests would also require evidence to be
presented about what transpired during the collaborative law process which, in
turn, would require courts to breach the privilege-and the policy of
confidentiality of collaborative law communications-that the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act seeks to create. See John Lande, Using Dispute System
Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected
Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 102-03 (2002) [hereinafter Lande,
Using Dispute System Design Methods].
It is important to remember that a party can unilaterally terminate
collaborative law at any time and for any reason, including failure of another
party to produce requested information. See infra § 5(b), (f). Thus, if a party
wishes to abandon collaborative law in favor of litigation for failure of
voluntary disclosure, the party is free to do so and to engage in any court
sanctioned discovery that might be available. Most disputed matters that reach
the formal litigation system settle before trial and before completion of formal
discovery. Parties to a collaborative law process are thus no different than
parties who participate in litigation or other dispute resolution processes in
having to make cost-benefit assessments with the aid of their counsel about
whether they have enough information from the informal process of disclosure
to settle at any particular time or need or want more. Stephen N. Subrin,
Reflections on the Twin Dreams of Simplified Procedure and Useful
Empiricism, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 173, 183 (2007).
Moreover, nothing in section 12 changes the standards under which
agreements or settlements that result from a collaborative law process are
approved by a tribunal, or can be reopened or voided because of a failure of
disclosure. Those standards are determined by law other than this act. Relevant
doctrines such as fraud, constructive fraud, reliance, disclosure requirements
imposed by fiduciary relationships, disclosure of special facts because of
superior knowledge and access to information are not affected by the act. Courts
can order settlement agreements voided or rescinded because of failure of
disclosure in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 866, 884 (1994); Terwilliger v. Terwilliger,
64 S.W.3d 816, 818-19 (Ky. 2002); Shafmaster v. Shafmaster, 642 A.2d 1361,
1364-65 (N.H. 1994); Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704, 709-10
(Minn. 1962); Rocca v. Rocca 760 N.E.2d 677, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002);
Billington v. Billington, 606 A.2d 737, 737-38 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
Many states, for example, mandate compulsory financial disclosure in
divorce cases even without a specific request from the other party. See N.Y.
DoM. REL. § 236(B)(4) (McKinney 1999) (mandating compulsory disclosure of
specific financial information without a request from the other party); ALASKA
R. Civ. P. 26.1 (2009) (listing information that must be disclosed to the other
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party in a divorce proceeding even in the absence of a request). Resolution of
divorce disputes in such states without these mandated disclosures would create
a risk of a malpractice action against a collaborative lawyer who advised a party
to accept such a settlement. See, e.g., Callahan v. Clark, 901 S.W.2d 842, 84748 (Ark. 1995); Grayson v. Wofsey, 646 A.2d 195, 199-200 (Conn. 1994). It
would also be surprising if courts approved agreements in settlement of
particular kinds of matters such as divorce, infants' estates, or class actions
without the kind of pre-agreement disclosure typical for such matters. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(e) (standard for judicial evaluation of settlement of a class action,
which is that the settlement must be fair, adequate, and reasonable); UNIF.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 306(d) (2008) (Parties agreement may be
incorporated into the divorce decree if the court finds that it is not
"unconscionable" regarding the property and maintenance and not
"unsatisfactory" regarding support); Robert H. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining:
The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. L.J. REFORM 1015, 1016 (1985).
Section 13 also allows the parties to reach their own agreement on the
scope of disclosure during the collaborative law process. The standards for what
must be disclosed during a collaborative law process will thus vary depending
on the nature of the matter, the participation agreement, and the assessment by
parties and their counsel about their need for more information to make an
informed settlement. Should the parties choose to provide more detailed
standards for their voluntary disclosure or to require formal or semi-formal
discovery demands they can do so in their collaborative law participation
agreement. See Charles J. Moxley, Jr., Discovery in Commercial Arbitration:
How Arbitrators Think, DISP. RESOL. J. Aug.-Oct. 2008, at 36, 39-40 (in

arbitration, the contract may specify how much discovery will be allowed, or
the attorneys for the parties may agree on the scope of discovery prior to the
preliminary conference with the arbitrator).
The standards the parties agree on for disclosure in their participation
agreements are, of course, subject to the provisions of other law which are not
changed by this act. As noted above, many states, for example, mandate
compulsory financial disclosure in divorce cases. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c) mandates disclosure in federal civil cases, and similar
provisions exist in state law in different areas. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101
(McKinney 2005) (requiring pre-trial disclosure of the qualifications and
expected

testimony

of

expert

witness);

42

PA.

CONS.

STAT.

ANN.

§ 1340(B)(1)(e) (West 2007) (mandating disclosures by agency in child
dependency proceeding); MICH. CT. R. 6.201 (mandating pre-trial disclosures in
criminal cases). Parties in collaborative law should take these provisions into
account in devising agreements concerning the scope of their disclosure.
Informed Consent to Participation in Collaborative Law
As previously discussed, the bar ethics committee's opinions that find
collaborative law consistent with the lawyer's professional responsibility
standards emphasize the importance of parties entering into collaborative law
with informed consent. "[F]avoring more client autonomy [in contractual
arrangements with lawyers] places great stress on the need for full lawyer
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disclosure and informed client consent before entering into agreements that pose
significant risks for clients." Schneyer, supra, at 320.
Section 14 thus places a duty on a potential collaborative lawyer to actively
facilitate client informed consent to participate in collaborative law. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct define informed consent as "the agreement by a
person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2002). See Conklin v. Hannoch Weisman, 678 A.2d
1060, 1069 (N.J. 1996) ("An attorney in a counseling situation must advise a
client of the risks of the transaction in terms sufficiently clear to enable the
client to assess the client's risks. The care must be commensurate with the risks
of the undertaking and tailored to the needs and sophistication of the client.").
The act's requirements for a lawyer to facilitate informed client consent to
participate in collaborative law are consistent with this general standard, but are
more detailed and tailored to collaborative law participation agreements. The
prospective collaborative lawyer is required to "assess with the prospective
party factors the [prospective collaborative] lawyer reasonably believes relate to
whether a collaborative law process is appropriate for the prospective party's
matter." See infra § 14(1) (emphasis added). The lawyer must also "provide the
prospective party with information that the lawyer reasonably believes is
sufficient for the party to make an informed decision about the material benefits
and risks of a collaborative law process as compared to . . other reasonably
available" forms of dispute resolution such as litigation, mediation, arbitration
or expert evaluation. See infra § 14(2). The act adopts the previously mentioned
requirement of many states that lawyers identify and discuss the costs and
benefits of other reasonable dispute resolution options with a potential party to
collaborative law, including litigation, cooperative law, mediation, expert
evaluation, or arbitration or some combination of these processes. Lande &
Herman, supra, at 281. The act also requires that a lawyer describe the benefits
of collaborative law to a potential party, along with its essential risk-that
termination of the process, which any party has the right to do at any time, will
cause the disqualification provision to take effect, imposing the economic and
emotional costs on all parties of engaging new counsel. See infra § 14(3).
The act thus envisions the lawyer as an educator of a prospective party
about the appropriate factors to consider in deciding whether to participate in a
collaborative law process. It also contemplates a process of discussion between
lawyer and prospective party that asks that the lawyer do more than lecture a
prospective party or provide written information about collaborative law and
other options. Collaborative lawyers should, of course, consider how to
document the process of informed consent and a party's decision to enter into a
collaborative law process through a provision of appropriate written documents.
Hopefully, lawyers who seek informed consent will take steps to continuously
make the information they provide to prospective parties ever easier to
understand and more complete. See Mosten, CollaborativeLaw Practice,supra,
at 172-73 (listing methods for obtaining informed consent).
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The act thus specifies the overall goals and standards of the process of
seeking informed client consent to participate in collaborative law. It leaves to
the collaborative lawyer the specific methods of achieving informed client
consent. "Lawyers should provide thorough and balanced descriptions of
[collaborative law] practice, including candid discussion of possible risks." John
Lande & Forrest S. Mosten, Collaborative Lawyers' Duties to Screen the
Appropriatenessof CollaborativeLaw and Obtain Clients'InformedConsent to
Use CollaborativeLaw, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 347 (2010).
Lawyers may understandably worry about losing possible
[collaborative law] cases if they provide more thorough and balanced
information... . [T]his risk of losing business is outweighed by the
professional and practice benefits (and obligations) of full disclosure
and truly informed consent. By providing appropriate information
before parties decide whether to use [collaborative law] lawyers can
have greater confidence that parties will have realistic expectations,
participate in the process more constructively and will be less likely to
terminate a [collaborative law] case.
Id. at 64 (footnotes omitted).
Collaborative Law and Coercive and Violent Relationships
While the act does not limit the reach of collaborative law to divorce and
family disputes, it does systematically address the problem of domestic
violence. The most significant provision of the act's approach to domestic
violence is the obligation it places on collaborative lawyers to make "reasonable
inquiry whether the [party or] prospective party has a history of a coercive or
violent relationship with another [party or] prospective party." See infra § 15(a).
If the lawyer "reasonably believes" the party the lawyer represents has such a
history, the lawyer may not begin or continue a collaborative law process unless
the party so requests and the lawyer "reasonably believes" the party's safety
"can be protected adequately during the collaborative law process." See infra

§ 15(c).
The act attempts no definition of domestic violence, as that term is defined
differently in different states. For example, Delaware, Maine, and New Mexico
define domestic violence to include not only physical acts of violence, but also
acts that cause emotional distress such as stalking and harassment, as well as
destruction of property, trespassing, and forcing a person to engage in certain
conduct through threats and intimidation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1041 (2006
& Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 4002 (1964, supp. 2008);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-2 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008). Colorado and Idaho, in
contrast, limit domestic violence to actual or threats of physical assault. COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-14-101 (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6303 (2002
& Supp. 2008).
To avoid definitional difficulties, the act instead uses the term "coercive or
violent relationship" instead of domestic violence. See infra § 15. This term
encapsulates the core characteristics of a relationship characterized by domestic
violence: "[p]hysical abuse, alone or in combination with sexual, economic or
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emotional abuse, stalking or other forms of coercive control, by an intimate
partner or household member, often for the purpose of establishing and
maintaining power and control over the victim." COMM'N ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS
REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND
STALKING IN CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER CASES 1 (2007). Physical violence or

the threat thereof is an element of a coercive and violent relationship but the
concept is broader, focusing on the perpetrator's pattern or practice of
intimidation.
There is no doubt that coercive and violent relationships are an element in a
significant number of matters that find their way to the legal system and pose a
serious, potentially lethal, threat to the safety of a significant number of victims
and dependents. They can arise in many different legal contexts such as a
divorce or parenting dispute, the dissolution of a business between formerly
intimate partners or in the abuse of the elderly surrounding the distribution of an
estate. See, e.g., Farrell v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Alaska 1991) (violent
relationship in a divorce case); People v. Irvine, 882 N.E.2d 1124, 1127 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2008) (defendant's assault of his girlfriend); Hicks v. Hicks, 733 So.
2d 1261, 1262, 1266 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (domestic violence in a divorce and
child custody suit); R.H. v. State, 709 So. 2d 129, 130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(domestic violence by the defendant against the defendant's mother); In re
Custody of Williams, 432 N.E.2d 375, 376-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (domestic
violence in a child custody case). Advocates for victims of domestic violence
have, over many years, made great progress in helping make the legal system
more responsive to the needs of victims of domestic violence. Nonetheless,
there is much we do not know about domestic violence, and many challenges
remain.
Because of definitional differences and research difficulties we do not
know, for example, exactly what percentage of disputes which find their way to
lawyers and courts involve coercion and violence. Furthermore, despite public
education campaigns, victims still are often reluctant to disclose the abuse they
suffer. See Nancy Ver Steegh & Clare Dalton, Report from the Wingspread
Conference on Domestic Violence and Family Courts, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 454,
460 (2008) (report of working group of experienced practitioners and
researchers convened by the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges and the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts summarizing the
state of research about domestic violence and discussing challenges in making
family court interventions more effective with families in which domestic
violence has been identified or alleged).
A coercive and violent relationship between parties is a serious problem for
the collaborative law process and all forms of ADR. An abuser's desire to
maintain dominance and control is inconsistent with the self determination that
the collaborative law process assumes. Fear of an abuser may prevent the victim
from asserting needs and a collaborative law session may give abusers access to
a victim. Resulting agreements may be unsafe for the victim or children. A
victim of a coercive and violent relationship could be additionally harmed if her
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lawyer is disqualified from further representation if collaborative law
terminates.
On the other hand, sporadic incidents not part of an overall pattern of
coercion and violence do occur in divorce and family and other disputes,
sometimes allegations of violence are exaggerated, and in some circumstances,
victims want and may be able to participate in a process of ADR like
collaborative law if their safety is assured. See Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and
Maybe: Informed Decision Making About Divorce Mediation in the Presence of
Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145, 196 (2003).
Reconciling the need to insure safety for victims of domestic violence with the
party autonomy that ADR processes such as collaborative law promotes and
assumes is thus a significant and continuing challenge for policy makers and
practitioners. See Peter Salem & Billie Lee Dunford-Jackson, Beyond Politics
and Positions: A Call for CollaborationBetween Family Court and Domestic
Violence Professionals, 46 FAM. CT. REV. 437, 444-50 (2008) (Executive
Director of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts and Co-Director
of the Family Violence Department of the National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges examine practical, political, definitional and ideological
differences between family court professionals who emphasize ADR and
domestic violence advocates and call for collaboration on behalf of families and
children).
Section 15 thus requires a collaborative lawyer to make a reasonable
effort to screen a potential party to collaborative law for a history of a coercive
and violent relationship. Brief screening protocols already exist which lawyers
can use to satisfy the obligation imposed by the act. See COMM'N ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, AM. BAR Ass'N, TOOL FOR ATTORNEYS TO SCREEN FOR DOMESTIC

VIOLENCE (2005), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/screeningtoolcdv.pdf;

see

also OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, MICH. SUP. CT., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
RELATIONS
SCREENING FOR DOMESTIC
CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT
AND

MEDIATION: MODEL SCREENING PROTOCOL 10-19 (2006). These obligations

placed on collaborative lawyers by the act to incorporate screening and
sensitivity to domestic violence in their representation of parties parallel
obligations placed on mediators. MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY
& DIVORCE MEDIATION Standard X (Symposium on Standards of Practice 2000)

("A family mediator shall recognize a family situation involving domestic abuse
and take appropriate steps to shape the mediation process accordingly."). "If
the
mediator
present
to
be
abuse
appears
domestic
of
the
safety
to
insure
taking
measures
shall
consider
participants . .. including . .. suspending or terminating the mediation sessions,

with appropriate steps to protect the safety of the participants." Id. at Standard
X(D).
Section 15(c) requires that the lawyer not commence or continue a
collaborative law process if the lawyer reasonably believes a potential party or
party is a victim of domestic violence unless the victim consents and the lawyer
reasonably believes that the victim's safety can be protected while the process
goes on. These conditions are designed to insure that the autonomy and decision
making power of the victim of domestic violence are respected in the decision
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to go forward or not with collaborative law. Many state statutes allow victims of
domestic violence to opt out of mediation. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-322(1) (Supp. 1994); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(2)(c) (2003)
(establishing that where mediation is used, the court shall not refer to mediation
any case in which there is a history of domestic violence that would impact the
effectiveness of mediation). See generally COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
AM. BAR Ass'N, MEDIATION IN FAMILY LAW MATTERS WHERE DV Is PRESENT
(2008), http://www.abanet.org/domviol/docs/Mediation _I2008.pdf (comprehensive
listing of state legislation and rules on subject as of the date of the compilation,
which includes the notation "[t]he law is constantly changing"). Section
15(c)(1) extends a similar option to collaborative law by requiring the victim's
consent to begin or continue the process.
The act requires the collaborative lawyer's "reasonable belief' and
"reasonable efforts" to insure safety of victims of violence and coercion in a
collaborative law process. Applying a brief screening protocol is a useful step
but not a guarantee that a lawyer will discover a party with a history of domestic
violence. The lawyer is also not an absolute guarantor of the safety of a party or
of fair results if a victim of a coercive and violent relationship chooses to go
forward with a collaborative law process. The act requires only that the lawyer
do what a reasonable lawyer faced with a similar history of violence and
coercion would do. But see Margaret Drew, Lawyer Malpracticeand Domestic
Violence: Are We Revictimizing Our Clients?, 39 FAM. L.Q. 7, 9-10, 12 (2005)
(arguing that a lawyer commits malpractice when he or she fails to recognize
when a client is or has been abused by a partner and fails to consider that factor
in providing legal representation to the client). A collaborative lawyer should
generally discuss the option of beginning, continuing or terminating a
collaborative law process with the victim with great care and sensitivity, and
memorialize the victim's decision in writing if possible.
The act addresses concerns about coercion and violence in several other
sections. Section 7 creates an exception to the stay of proceedings created by
filing a notice of collaborative law with a tribunal for "emergency orders to
protect the health, safety, welfare or interest of a party or family or household
member." Section 9(c)(2) also creates an exception to the disqualification
requirement for a collaborative lawyer and lawyers in a law firm with which the
collaborative lawyer is associated to represent a victim or an alleged abuser in
proceedings seeking such emergency orders if other lawyers are not
immediately available. These sections insure that a victim of coercion and
violence and an alleged abuser who participate in collaborative law will
continue to have the assistance of counsel and access to the court in the face of
an immediate threat to her safety or that of her dependent. They are consistent
with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provisions that "a lawyer may
withdraw from representing a client if. . . withdrawal can be accomplished
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client," and that "[u]pon
termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent reasonably
practicable to protect a client's interests." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.16(b) (2002) (emphasis added).
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Finally, the act, like the Uniform Mediation Act, creates an exception to the
evidentiary privilege otherwise extended to a collaborative law communication
which is: "a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a
crime of violence," Section 19(a)(2); or is "intentionally used to plan a crime,
commit or attempt to commit a crime, or conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing
criminal activity," Section 19(a)(3); or is "sought or offered to prove or disprove
abuse, neglect, abandonment, or exploitation of a child," Section 19(b)(2).
These exceptions recognize that the need for confidentiality in collaborative law
communications must yield to the value of protecting the safety of victims of
coercion and violence.
The act does not, however, prescribe special qualifications and training in
domestic violence for collaborative lawyers and other professionals who
participate in the collaborative law process for fear of inflexibly regulating a
still-developing dispute resolution process. The act also takes this position to
minimize the previously mentioned risk of raising separation of powers
concerns in some states between the judicial branch and the legislature in
prescribing the conditions under which attorneys may practice law. See supra
p. 449 (discussing the act's lack of prescription for special qualifications and
training in domestic violence for collaborative lawyers). The drafters recognize
that representing victims of coercion and violence is a complex task requiring
specialized knowledge, especially when the representation occurs in dispute
resolution processes like collaborative law which rely heavily on selfdetermination by parties. They encourage collaborative lawyers who represent a
party with a history of coercion and violence to be familiar with nationally
accepted standards of practice for representing victims. These include standards
created by the ABA-the Standards of Practice for Representing Victims of
Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking in Civil Protection Order Cases
(2007); Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse
and Neglect Cases (1996); and Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who
Represent Parents in Abuse and Neglect Cases (2005).
Collaborative Law Communications and Evidentiary Privilege
A major contribution of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act is to create a
privilege for collaborative law communications in legal proceedings, where it
would otherwise either not be available or not be available in a uniform way
across the states. The Uniform Collaborative Law Act's privilege for
communications made in the collaborative law process is similar to the privilege
provided to communications during mediation by the Uniform Mediation Act.
Protection for confidentiality of communications is central to collaborative
law. Parties may enter collaborative law with fear that what they say during
collaborative law sessions may be used against them in later proceedings.
Without assurances that communications made during the collaborative law
process will not be used to their detriment later, parties, collaborative lawyers
and nonparty participants such as mental health and financial professionals will
be reluctant to speak frankly, test out ideas and proposals, or freely exchange
information. Undermining the confidentiality of the process would impair full
use of collaborative law. Lande, Good Faith Participation,supra, at 102.
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Confidentiality of communications can also refer to broader concepts than
admission of the information into the formal record of a proceeding. It is
possible for collaborative law communications to be disclosed outside of legal
proceedings, for example, to family members, friends, business associates, the
press, and the general public. Like the Uniform Mediation Act, however, the
Uniform Collaborative Law Act limits statutory protections for confidentiality
to legal proceedings. It does not prohibit disclosure of collaborative law
communications to third parties outside of legal proceedings. That issue is left
to the agreement of the parties as expressed in their collaborative law
participation agreements, other bodies of law, and to the ethical standards of the
professions involved in collaborative law. See infra § 16; see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009) (stating that an attorney is required to

keep in confidence "information relating to the representation of a client unless
the client gives informed consent [or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in
order to carry out the representation" or under a few exceptions, including,
among others, when it is necessary to prevent reasonably certain death or
substantial bodily harm or to comply with a court order or law).
The drafters believe that a statute is required only to assure that aspect of
confidentiality relating to evidence compelled in judicial and other legal
proceedings. Parties uniformly expect that aspect of confidentiality to be
enforced by the courts, and a statute is required to ensure that it is. Parties'
expectations of additional confidentiality need clarification by mutual
agreement. Do they want, for example, to be able to reveal collaborative law
communications regarding a potential divorce settlement agreement concerning
children to friends and family members for the purposes of seeking advice and
emotional comfort? Parties can answer questions like that "yes" or "no" or
"sometimes" in their agreements depending on their particular needs and
orientation.
Parties can expect enforcement of their agreement to keep communications
more broadly confidential through contract damages and, sometimes, specific
enforcement. The courts have also enforced court orders or rules regarding
nondisclosure through orders to strike pleadings and fine lawyers. See UNIF.
MEDIATION ACT § 8 cmt. a, 7A U.L.A. 138 (2006); see also Bernard v. Galen
Group, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 778, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Paranzino v. Barnett Bank
of S. Fla., 690 So. 2d 725, 729-30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
Promises, contracts, and court rules or orders are unavailing, however, with
respect to discovery, trial, and otherwise compelled or subpoenaed evidence.
While the earliest recognized privileges were judicially created, this practice
stopped over a century ago. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 75, at 136
(Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). Today, evidentiary privileges are rooted
within legislative action; some state legislatures have even passed statutes
which bar court-created privileges. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 911 (West
2009); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.01 (West 2000).
The settlement negotiations privilege does not provide the same level of
protection for collaborative law communications as does the privilege created
by the act. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, and similar state rules of
evidence, while a settlement offer and its accompanying negotiations may not
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be admitted into evidence in order to prove liability or invalidity of a claim or
its amount, it may be admissible for a variety of other purposes. FED. R. EVID.
408; see also Lohman v. Duryea Borough, 574 F.3d 163, 167 (3d Cir. 2009)
("Rule 408 does not bar a court's consideration of settlement negotiations in its
analysis of what constitutes a reasonable [attorney's] fee award."); Lo Bosco v.
Kure Eng'g Ltd., 891 F. Supp. 1035, 1039-40 (D.N.J. 1995) (plaintiffs offer of
reconciliation to spouse in letters related to a divorce proceeding is not
admissible as an admission of liability in subsequent lawsuit against spouse
based on failed business relationships, but is admissible for other purposes such
as proving plaintiffs bias or prejudice, or negating a contention of undue
delay); FDIC v. Moore, 898 P.2d 1329, 1332 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) (trial court
erred in holding the debtors' letter offers of settlement inadmissible because
they were admissible on the issue of commencement of a new statute of
limitations period). See generally 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 523 (2008) (citing
relevant examples of case law in fourteen states).
By contrast, the Uniform Collaborative Law Act provides for a broader
prohibition on later disclosure of communications within the collaborative law
process in the legal process, making those communications inadmissible for any
purpose other than those specified in the act. For example, the evidentiary
privilege in the act applies to an array of communications, not limited to those
produced in a formal four-way session such as communications before the
session begins and in preparation for the session. In addition, the privilege
allows parties to block not only their own testimony from future disclosure, but
also communications by any other participant in the collaborative law process
such as jointly retained experts. To encourage non-parties such as mental health
professionals and financial experts to participate in collaborative law, the act
gives them a privilege to block their own communications from being
introduced into evidence.
The act also explicitly lists the exceptions to the evidentiary privilege it
creates. As with the privilege for mediation communications, the privilege for
collaborative law communications has limits and exceptions codified in sections
18 and 19, primarily to give appropriate weight to other valid justice system
values, such as the protections of bodily integrity and to prosecute and protect
against serious crime. They often apply to situations that arise only rarely, but
might produce grave injustice in that unusual case if not excepted from the
privilege.
The Need for a Uniform Collaborative Law Act
It is foreseeable that collaborative law participation agreements and
sessions will cross jurisdictional boundaries as parties relocate, and as the
collaborative law process is carried on through conference calls between
collaborative lawyers and parties in different states and even over the Internet.
Choice of law determinations can be complex and the standards to resolve them
sometimes indeterminate. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 107, 7C U.L.A. 436 (2000)
(requiring courts to determine the meaning and effect of the terms of a trust by
reference to "the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the
designation of that jurisdiction's law is contrary to a strong public policy of the
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jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue; or in
the absence of a controlling designation in the terms of the trust, the law of the
jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the matter at issue").
Because it is often unclear which state's laws apply, the parties cannot be
assured of the reach of their home state's provisions on the enforceability of
collaborative law participation agreements and confidentiality protections.
A Uniform Collaborative Law Act will help bring order and understanding
of the collaborative law process across state lines and encourage the growth and
development of collaborative law in a number of ways. It will ensure that
collaborative law participation agreements entered into in one state are
enforceable in another state if one of the parties moves or relocates. Enactment
of the Uniform Collaborative Law Act will also ensure more predictable results
if a communication made in collaborative law in one state is sought in litigation
or other legal processes in another state. Parties to the collaborative law process
cannot always know where the later litigation may occur. Without uniformity,
there can be no firm assurance in any state that a privilege for communications
during the collaborative law process will be recognized. Uniformity will add
certainty on these issues, and thus will encourage better-informed party selfdetermination about whether to participate in collaborative law.
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UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LAW ACT
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This [act] may be cited as the Uniform
Collaborative Law Act.

SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS. in this [act]:
(1) "Collaborative law communication" means a statement, whether oral or
in a record, or verbal or nonverbal, that:
(A) is made to conduct, participate in, continue, or reconvene a
collaborative law process; and
(B) occurs after the parties sign a collaborative law participation
agreement and before the collaborative law process is concluded.
(2) "Collaborative law participation agreement" means an agreement by
persons to participate in a collaborative law process.
(3) "Collaborative law process" means a procedure intended to resolve a
collaborative matter without intervention by a tribunal in which persons:
(A) sign a collaborative law participation agreement; and
(B) are represented by collaborative lawyers.
(4) "Collaborative lawyer" means a lawyer who represents a party in a
collaborative law process.
(5) "Collaborative matter" means a dispute, transaction, claim, problem, or
issue for resolution described in a collaborative law participation agreement.
The term includes a dispute, claim, or issue in a proceeding.
(6) "Law firm" means:
(A) lawyers who practice law together in a partnership, professional
corporation, sole proprietorship, limited liability company, or association; and
(B) lawyers employed in a legal services organization, or the legal
department of a corporation or other organization, or the legal department of a
government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality.
(7) "Nonparty participant" means a person, other than a party and the
party's collaborative lawyer, that participates in a collaborative law process.
(8) "Party" means a person that signs a collaborative law participation
agreement and whose consent is necessary to resolve a collaborative matter.
(9) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, public
corporation, government or governmental subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Proceeding" means:
(A) a judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative process
before a tribunal, including related prehearing and post-hearing motions,
conferences, and discovery; or
(B) a legislative hearing or similar process.
(11) "Prospective party" means a person that discusses with a prospective
collaborative lawyer the possibility of signing a collaborative law participation
agreement.
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(12) "Record" means information that is inscribed on a tangible medium or
that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form.
(13) "Related to a collaborative matter" means involving the same parties,
transaction or occurrence, nucleus of operative fact, dispute, claim, or issue as
the collaborative matter.
(14) "Sign" means, with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record:
(A) to execute or adopt a tangible symbol; or
(B) to attach to or logically associate with the record an electronic
symbol, sound, or process.
(15) "Tribunal" means
(A) a court, arbitrator, administrative agency, or other body acting in
an adjudicative capacity which, after presentation of evidence or legal
argument, has jurisdiction to render a decision affecting a party's interests in a
matter; or
(B) a legislative body conducting a hearing or similar process.
Comment
"Collaborative law process" and "collaborative
agreement." A collaborative law process is created by
collaborative law participation agreement. It requires
collaborative lawyers. The minimum requirements for
participation agreements are specified in section 4.

law participation
written contract, a
parties to engage
collaborative law

"Collaborative law communication." Section 17 creates an evidentiary
privilege for collaborative law communications, a term defined here.
The definition of "collaborative law communication" parallels the
definition of "mediation communication" in the Uniform Mediation Act section
2(2). Collaborative law communications are statements that are made orally,
through conduct, or in writing or other recorded activity. This definition is
similar to the general rule, as reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(a),
which defines a "statement" as "an oral or written assertion or nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion."
Understandable confusion has sometimes resulted because the terms "oral"
and "verbal" are both used in section 2(1) and some think the terms are
synonymous. They are not. "Oral" can be defined as "[u]ttered by the mouth or
in words; spoken, not written." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1095 (6th ed. 1990).
Although commonly used interchangeably with "oral," "verbal" is defined
strictly as "of or pertaining to words; expressed in words, whether spoken or
written." Id. at 1558. "Thus, 'verbal' is a broader term, and it is possible for
something to be verbal but not oral." Gary M. McLaughlin, Note, Oral
Contracts in the EntertainmentIndustry, I VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 101, 102 n.6
(2001); see also Lynn E. MacBeth, Lessons In Legalese: Words Commonly
Misused by Lawyer ... or, Sounds Like, LAW. J., May 2002, at 6
("Unfortunately, the word verbal has been so misused that . .. it has come to
mean 'oral.' However, in standard English verbal means 'consisting of words,'
as opposed to nonverbal, which is communication by signs, symbols, and means
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other than words.. .. The correct adjective for a spoken communication is oral,
or if you want to sound more erudite, parol. Verbal communication
encompasses both written and spoken communication that consists of words.").
Most generic mediation privileges cover communications but do not cover
conduct that is not intended as an assertion. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-206
(1999); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1119 (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 679C.102,
679C.104 (West Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-452a (2008) (assertive
representations); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233,

§ 23C (1986); MONT. CODE

ANN. § 26-1-813 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2914 (LexisNexis 2004); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 48.109 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-9 (West
2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

12,

§ 2317.023 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

§ 1805 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.220 (West 2003); 42 PA.

CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5949 (West 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-44 (1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-13-32 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-576.10 (2007);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 5.60.070 (West 2009); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 904.085

(West 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-43-102 (2009). The same is true of the
privilege created by this act.
The mere fact that a person attended a collaborative law session-in other
words, the physical presence of a person-is not a communication. By contrast,
nonverbal conduct such as nodding in response to a question would be a
"communication" because it is meant as an assertion; however nonverbal
conduct such as smoking a cigarette during the collaborative law session
typically would not be a "communication" because it was not meant by the actor
as an assertion.
Mental impressions that are based even in part on collaborative law
communications would generally be protected by privilege. More specifically,
communications include both statements and conduct meant to inform, because
the purpose of the privilege is to promote candid collaborative law
communications. But see United States v. Robinson, 121 F.3d 971, 975 (5th Cir.
1997) (finding that ordinarily the act of giving a document to an attorney will
not be privileged). By analogy to the attorney-client privilege, silence in
response to a question may be a communication, if it is meant to inform. But see
United States v. White, 950 F.2d 426, 430 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting the
distinction between communication and lack of communication). Further,
conduct meant to explain or communicate a fact, such as the re-enactment of an
accident, is a communication. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 503.14[3][a] (Joseph M.

McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997). Similarly, a client's revelation of a hidden scar to
an attorney in response to a question is a communication if meant to inform. In
contrast, a purely physical phenomenon, such as a tattoo or the color of a suit of
clothes, observable by all, is not a communication.
If evidence of mental impressions would reveal, even indirectly,
collaborative law communications, then that evidence would be blocked by the
privilege. See Gunther v. United States, 230 F.2d 222, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
For example, a party's mental impressions of the capacity of another party to
enter into a binding settlement agreement would be privileged if that impression
was in part based on the statements that the party made during the collaborative
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law process, because the testimony might reveal the content or character of the
collaborative law communications upon which the impression is based. In
contrast, the mental impression would not be privileged if it was based
exclusively on the party's observation of that party wearing heavy clothes and
an overcoat on a hot summer day because the choice of clothing was not meant
to inform. See, e.g., Darrow v. Gunn, 594 F.2d 767, 774 (9th Cir. 1979)
(discussing California law which states that observations and impressions of
clients are not privileged).
The definition of "collaborative law communication" has a fixed time
element-it only includes communications that occur between the time a
collaborative law participation agreement is signed and before a collaborative
law process is concluded. The methods and requirements for beginning and
concluding a collaborative law process are specified in Section 5. The defined
time period and methods for ascertaining are designed to make it easier for
tribunals to determine the applicability of the privilege to a proposed
collaborative law communication.
The definition of collaborative law communication does include some
communications that are not made during actual negotiation sessions, such as
those made for purposes of convening or continuing a negotiation session after a
collaborative law process begins. It also includes "briefs" and other reports that
are prepared by the parties for the collaborative law process.
Whether a document is prepared for a collaborative law process is a crucial
issue in determining whether it is a "collaborative law communication." For
example, a tax return brought to a collaborative law negotiation session for a
divorce settlement would not be a "collaborative law communication," even
though it may have been used extensively in the process, because it was not
created for "purposes of conducting, participating in, continuing, or reconvening
a collaborative law process," but rather because it is a requirement of federal
law. However, a note written on the tax return to clarify a point for other
participants during a negotiation session would be a collaborative law
communication. Similarly, a memorandum specifically prepared for the
collaborative law process by a party or a party's counsel explaining the rationale
behind certain positions taken on the tax return would be a collaborative law
communication. Documents prepared for a collaborative law process by experts
retained by the parties would also be covered by this definition.
"Collaborative lawyer." A collaborative lawyer represents a party in a
collaborative law process. As discussed in the Preface, a party must be
represented by a lawyer to participate in a collaborative law process; it is not an
option for the self-represented. Section 4(a)(5) requires that a collaborative law
participation agreement identify the collaborative lawyer who represents each
party and Section 4(a)(6) requires that the agreement contain a statement by the
designated lawyer confirming the representation.
"Collaborative matter." The act uses the term "matter" rather the narrower
term "dispute" to describe what the parties may attempt to resolve through a
collaborative law process. Matter can include some or all of the issues in
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litigation or potential litigation, or can include issues between the parties that
have not or may never ripen into litigation. The broader term emphasizes that
parties have great autonomy to decide what to submit to a collaborative law
process and encourages them to use the process creatively and broadly.
The parties must, however, describe the matter that they seek to resolve
through a collaborative law process in their collaborative law participation
agreement. See infra § 4(a)(4). That requirement is essential to determining the
scope of the disqualification requirement for collaborative lawyers under section
9, which is applicable to the collaborative matter and matters "related to the
collaborative matter," and the application of the evidentiary privilege under
section 17.
"Law firm." This definition of "law firm" is adapted from the definition of the
term in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.0(c). It includes
lawyers representing governmental entities whether employed by the
government or by a private law firm. It is included to help define the scope of
the imputed disqualification requirement of Section 9.
"Nonparty participant." This definition parallels the definition of "nonparty
participant" in the Uniform Mediation Act section 2(4). It covers experts,
friends, support persons, potential parties, and others who participate in the
collaborative law process. Nonparty participants are entitled to assert a privilege
before a tribunal for their own collaborative law communications under Section
17(b)(2). This provision is designed to encourage mental health and financial
professionals to participate in a collaborative law process without fear of
becoming embroiled in litigation without their consent should the process
terminate.
Nonparty participant does not, however, include a collaborative lawyer for
a party. The attorney-client privilege is applicable to communications between a
collaborative lawyer and the party whom he or she represents. The collaborative
attorney thus has the obligation placed upon all lawyers to maintain client
confidences and assert evidentiary privilege for client communications. The
obligations of professional responsibility for a lawyer are not altered by the
lawyer's representation of a party in collaborative law. See infra § 13. Under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct the attorney-client privilege is held by the
client and can only be waived by the client, even over the attorney's objection.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002) ("A lawyer shall not

reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
gives informed consent .... " (emphasis added)); see also Hunt v. Blackburn,
128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) ("[T]he [attorney-client] privilege is that of the client
alone, and no rule prohibits the latter from divulging his own secrets; and if the
client has voluntarily waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to close the
mouth of the attorney"). An attorney does not have the right to override a
client's decision to waive privilege, and including collaborative lawyers in the
category of nonparty participants entitled to independently assert privilege
might be thought of as changing that traditional view. See, e.g., Comm'r v.
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Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 436 (2005) ("The attorney is an agent who is dutybound
to act only in the interests of the principal"); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 1(3) cmt. e (1958) (stating that an attorney is an agent authorized to
act under the control of another). A collaborative lawyer thus does not have any
additional right to independently assert privilege because of the lawyer's
participation in the collaborative law process as a "nonparty."
A few states declare ADR neutrals incompetent to testify about
communications in the ADR processes. The declaration of incompetence to
testify normally does not apply to lawyers representing clients, but is limited to
third party neutrals, such as mediators and arbitrators. See CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 703.5 (West 1995 & Supp. 2009) In Minnesota, the competency standard has
been extended to lawyers participating in mediation as well. See MINN. GEN. R.
PRAC. ANN. §§ 114.08, 595.02(1)(b) (West 2000).
"Party." The act's definition of "party" is central to determining who has rights
and obligations under the act, especially the right to assert the evidentiary
privilege for collaborative law communications. Fortunately, parties to a
collaborative law process are relatively easy to identify-they are signatories to
a collaborative law participation agreement and they engage designated
collaborative lawyers.
Participants in a collaborative law process who do not meet the definition
of "party," such as an expert retained jointly by the parties to provide input, do
not have the substantial rights under additional sections that are provided to
parties. Rather, these nonparty participants are granted a more limited
evidentiary privilege under section 17(b)(2)-they can prevent disclosure of
their own collaborative law communications but not those of parties or others
who participate in the process. Parties seeking to apply broader restrictions on
disclosures by such nonparty participants should consider drafting such a
confidentiality obligation into a valid and binding agreement that the nonparty
participant signs as a condition of participation in the collaborative law process.
"Person." Section 2(9) adopts the standard language recommended by the
Uniform Law Commission for the drafting of statutory language, and the term
should be interpreted in a manner consistent with that usage.
"Proceeding." The definition of "proceeding" is drawn from section 2(7) of the
Uniform Mediation Act. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT

§ 2(7), 7A U.L.A. 105-06

(2006). Its purpose is to define the adjudicative type proceedings to which the
act applies, and should be read broadly to effectuate the intent of the act. It was
added to allow the drafters to delete repetitive language throughout the act, such
as "judicial, administrative, arbitral, or other adjudicative processes, including
related pre-hearing and post-hearing motions, conferences, and discovery;
or ... a legislative hearing or similar process." Id.
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"Prospective party." The definition of "prospective party" is drawn from the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.18(a) which defines a
lawyer's duty to a prospective client. The act uses the term "party" rather than
"client" to clarify that it does not change the standards of professional
responsibility applicable to lawyers. The collaborative lawyer's obligations to
prospective parties are described in sections 14 and 15.
"Related to a collaborative matter." Under section 9, a collaborative lawyer
and lawyers in a law firm with which the collaborative law is associated are
disqualified from representing parties in court in a matter "related to a
collaborative matter" when a collaborative law process concludes. The
definition of "related to a collaborative matter" thus determines the scope of the
disqualification provision. The rationale and application of the definition of
"related to a collaborative matter" is discussed in detail in the Prefatory Note.
See supra pp. 451-52.
"Sign." The definitions of "record" and "sign" adopt standard language
approved by the Uniform Law Commission intended to conform Uniform Acts
with the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) and its federal
counterpart, Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (ESign). Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No.
106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7002
(2006));

UNIF.

ELEC.

TRANSACTION

ACT

§2

(1999),

available

at

http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.pdf. Both UETA
and E-Sign were written in response to broad recognition of the commercial and
other uses of electronic technologies for communications and contracting, and
the consensus that the choice of medium should not control the enforceability of
transactions. UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTION ACT, Prefatory Note (1999); DEP'T OF
COMMERCE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES IN GLOBAL AND
NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT: THE CONSUMER CONSENT PROVISION IN SECTION

101(s)(1)(c)(ii), at i (2001). These sections are consistent with both UETA and
E-Sign. UETA has been adopted by the Commission and received the approval
of the ABA House of Delegates. See generally UNIF. ELEC. TRANSACTION ACT
(1999); RICHARD L. FIELD, AM. BAR Ass'N SECTION OF SCI. & TECH. LAW &

MICHAEL H. BYOWITZ, AM.
303,
RECOMMENDATION

BAR
at

Ass'N SECTION
(2006),
6

OF INT'L LAW,
at
available

http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/policy/investment/unelectroniccomm0806.pdf;
The Unif. Law Comm'rs, The National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Electronic Transactions
http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp
Act,
(last visited May 25, 2010). As of December 2001, it had been enacted in more
than 35 states. The National Conference of State Legislatures, Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13484
(last visited May 25, 2010).
The practical effect of these definitions is to make clear that electronic
signatures and documents have the same authority as written ones for such
purposes as establishing the validity of a collaborative law participation
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agreement under section 4, notice to terminate the collaborative law process
under section 5(d)(1), party agreements concerning the confidentiality of
collaborative law communications under section 16, and party waiver of the
collaborative law communication privilege under section 19(f).
"Tribunal." The definition of "tribunal" is adapted from Rule 1.0(m) of the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. It is included to insure the
provisions of this act are applicable in judicial and other forums such as
arbitration and is consistent with the broad definition of "proceeding" in
subsection 10.

SECTION 3. APPLICABILITY. This [act] applies to a collaborative
law participation agreement that meets the requirements of section 4 signed [on
or] after [the effective date of this [act].
Comment
Section 3 defines the scope of the act and limits its applicability to
collaborative law participation agreements that meet the requirements of
section 4. While parties are free to collaborate in any other way they choose, if
parties want the benefits and protections of this act they must meet its
requirements, subject to the "savings" provisions of section 20.
Section 3 also sets an effective date for the act so that the parties can decide
when to "opt in" to its provisions. It precludes application of the act to
collaborative law participation agreements before the effective date on the
assumption that most of those making these agreements did not take into
account the changes in law. The evidentiary privilege created by the act in
section 17, for example, does not apply retroactively to agreements made before
the act's effective date. If parties to these collaborative law participation
agreements seek to be covered by the act, they can sign a new agreement on or
after the effective date of the act or amend an existing agreement to conform to
the act's requirements.

SECTION 4. COLLABORATIVE LAW PARTICIPATION
AGREEMENT; REQUIREMENTS.
(a) A collaborative law participation agreement must:
(1) be in a record;
(2) be signed by the parties;
(3) state the parties' intention to resolve a collaborative matter through
a collaborative law process under this [act];
(4) describe the nature and scope of the matter;
(5) identify the collaborative lawyer who represents each party in the
process; and
(6) contain a statement by each collaborative lawyer confirming the
lawyer's representation of a party in the collaborative law process.
(b) Parties may agree to include in a collaborative law participation
agreement additional provisions not inconsistent with this [act].
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Comment
Subsection (a) sets minimum conditions for the validity of collaborative
law participation agreements. They are designed to insure that a written record
evidences the parties' agreement and intent to participate in a collaborative law
process under the act. They were formulated to require collaborative law
participation agreements to be fundamentally fair, but simple, and thus to make
collaborative law more accessible to potential parties with matters in a wide
variety of areas.
To qualify as a collaborative law participation agreement, the parties must
explicitly state their intention to proceed "under this act." The participation
agreement must thus specifically reference this act to make its provisions such
as the evidentiary privilege for collaborative law communications applicable.
This requirement is designed to help insure that parties make a deliberate
decision to "opt into" in a collaborative law process rather than participate by
inadvertence. It is also designed to differentiate a collaborative law process
under this act from other types of cooperative or collaborative behavior or
dispute resolution involving parties and lawyers.
The requirements of subsection (a) are also designed to help tribunals and
parties more easily administer and interpret the disqualification and evidentiary
privileges provisions of the act. It is, for example, difficult to determine the
scope of the disqualification requirement unless the parties describe the matter
submitted to collaborative law in their participation agreement and designate
collaborative lawyers.
The requirements of subsection (a) are subject to the provisions of
section 20 which give a tribunal discretion to find that, despite flaws in their
written participation agreement, parties reasonably believed they were
participating in a collaborative law process and thus to apply the provisions of
the act "in the interests ofjustice."
Many collaborative law participation agreements are far more detailed than
the minimum form requirements that subsection (a) contemplates and contain
numerous additional provisions. In the interest of encouraging further
continuing growth and development of collaborative law, subsection (b)
authorizes additional provisions to be included in participation agreements if
they are not inconsistent with the act.
Subsection (b), however, does not give unlimited discretion to add
provisions to a collaborative law participation agreement. They cannot modify
the defining characteristics of the collaborative law process or agree to waive
the act's protections for prospective parties. Parties thus cannot waive a party's
right to terminate collaborative law with or without cause, for any reason at any
time during the process set forth in section 5, the disqualification requirements
of sections 9, 10, and 11, the informed consent requirements of section 14, or
the prospective collaborative lawyer's duty to inquire into a history of coercive
and violent relationships between parties required by section 15. This provision
of the act should thus be interpreted as analogous to those which set minimum
provisions for valid arbitration agreements, which also cannot be waived. See

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

55

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

476

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:421

UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 4(b) (2000) (identifying provisions that parties
cannot waive in a pre-dispute arbitration clause such as the right to counsel).
Parties are, however, free to supplement the required provisions under the
act with additional terms that meet their particular needs and circumstances that
are not inconsistent with the fundamental nature of the collaborative law
process. For example, they may define the scope of voluntary disclosure under
section 12. They may provide for broader protection for the confidentiality of
collaborative law communications than the privilege against disclosure in legal
proceedings provided in section 16. See supra § 4(b). They may provide, as do
many models of collaborative law practice, for the engagement of jointly
retained neutral experts to participate in collaborative law and prohibit parties
from retaining their own experts. They may provide that experts retained for the
purpose of consulting with parties during the collaborative law process may
testify at trial if the collaborative law process concludes. They may provide that
if the collaborative law process terminates, litigation may not be instituted for a
short, set period of time, a common provision in collaborative law participation
agreements. They may agree to toll applicable statutes of limitations during the
collaborative law process or include choice-of-law clauses in their participation
agreements. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S.
52, 63-64 (1995) (holding that "the choice-of-law provision covers the rights
and duties of the parties, while the arbitration clause covers arbitration; neither
sentence intrudes upon the other"); Homa v. Am. Express Co., 558 F.3d 225,
227 (3d Cir. 2009) (stating that New Jersey courts will uphold choice-of-law
provisions so long as they do not violate public policy); Badger v. Boulevard
Bancorp, Inc., 970 F.2d 410, 410-11 (7th Cir. 1992) (enforcing an agreement
tolling the statute of limitations); SEC v. DiBella, 409 F. Supp. 2d 122, 129 (D.
Conn. 2006) (finding the Tolling Agreement of the statute of limitations valid
and binding); DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670, 677 (Tex. 1990)
(stating that judicial respect for the parties' choice of law advances the policy
party autonomy).
Appropriate bar groups should be encouraged to develop form collaborative
law participation agreements for use by lawyers and parties that comply with
the requirements of this act. See Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347, 363 (N.J.
2009) (making a similar suggestion for arbitration agreements in family law).

SECTION 5. BEGINNING AND
COLLABORATIVE LAW PROCESS.

CONCLUDING

A

(a) A collaborative law process begins when the parties sign a
collaborative law participation agreement.
(b) A tribunal may not order a party to participate in a collaborative law
process over that party's objection.
(c) A collaborative law process is concluded by a:
(1) resolution of a collaborative matter as evidenced by a signed
record;
(2) resolution of a part of the collaborative matter, evidenced by a
signed record, in which the parties agree that the remaining parts of the matter
will not be resolved in the process; or
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(3) termination of the process.
(d) A collaborative law process terminates:
(1) when a party gives notice to other parties in a record that the
process is ended; or
(2) when a party:
(A) begins a proceeding related to a collaborative matter without
the agreement of all parties; or
(B) in a pending proceeding related to the matter:
(i) initiates a pleading, motion, order to show cause, or request
for a conference with the tribunal;
(ii) requests that the proceeding be put on the [tribunal's
active calendar]; or
(iii) takes similar action requiring notice to be sent to the
parties; or
(3) except as otherwise provided by subsection (g), when a party
discharges a collaborative lawyer or a collaborative lawyer withdraws from
further representation of a party.
(e) A party's collaborative lawyer shall give prompt notice to all other
parties in a record of a discharge or withdrawal.
(f) A party may terminate a collaborative law process with or without
cause.
(g) Notwithstanding the discharge or withdrawal of a collaborative lawyer,
a collaborative law process continues, if not later than 30 days after the date that
the notice of the discharge or withdrawal of a collaborative lawyer required by
subsection (e)(3) is sent to the parties:
(1) the unrepresented party engages a successor collaborative lawyer;
and
(2) in a signed record:
(A) the parties consent to continue the process by reaffirming the
collaborative law participation agreement;
(B) the agreement is amended to identify the successor
collaborative lawyer; and
(C) the successor collaborative lawyer confirms the lawyer's
representation of a party in the collaborative process.
(h) A collaborative law process does not conclude if, with the consent of
the parties, a party requests a tribunal to approve a resolution of the
collaborative matter or any part thereof as evidenced by a signed record.
(i) A collaborative law participation agreement may provide additional
methods of concluding a collaborative law process.
Comment
Section 5 protects a party's right to terminate participation in
collaborative law process at any time, with or without reason or cause for any
for no reason. Subsection (b) emphasizes the voluntary nature of participation
a collaborative law process by prohibiting tribunals from ordering a person
participate in a collaborative law process over that person's objection.
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Section 5 is also designed to make it as administratively easy for parties
and tribunals as possible to determine when a collaborative law process begins
and ends. To the extent feasible, it links those events to signed records
communicated between the parties and collaborative lawyers or events that are
documented in the record of a tribunal. Establishing the beginning and end of a
collaborative law process is particularly important for application of the
evidentiary privilege for collaborative law communications recognized by
section 17 which applies only to communications in that period.
The evidentiary privilege for collaborative law communications ends when
the collaborative law process concludes. The act specifies two methods of
concluding a collaborative law process: (1) agreement for resolution of all or
part of a matter in a signed record (assuming that the parties do not agree to
continue the collaborative law process to resolve the remaining issues); and (2)
termination of the process. A party can terminate the process in several ways,
including sending notice in a record of termination and by taking acts that are
inconsistent with the continuation of collaborative law, such as commencing or
recommencing an action in court. Withdrawal or discharge of a collaborative
lawyer also terminates the process, and triggers an obligation to give notice on
the former collaborative lawyer. See supra § 5(e).
Section 5(g) allows for continuation of a collaborative law process even if a
party and a collaborative lawyer terminate their lawyer-client relationship, if a
successor collaborative lawyer is engaged in a defined period of time and under
conditions and with documentation which indicate that the parties want the
collaborative law process to continue.
Section 5(h) allows the parties to agree to present an agreement resulting
from a collaborative law process to a tribunal for approval under section 8
without terminating the process. Read together, these sections allow, for
example, collaborative lawyers in divorce proceedings to present uncontested
settlement agreements to the court for approval and incorporation into a court
order as local practice dictates. The collaborative law process-and the
evidentiary privilege for collaborative law communications-is not terminated
by presentation of the settlement agreement to the court.

SECTION 6. PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE TRIBUNAL;
STATUS REPORT.
(a) Persons in a proceeding pending before a tribunal may sign a
collaborative law participation agreement to seek to resolve a collaborative
matter related to the proceeding. Parties shall file promptly with the tribunal a
notice of the agreement after it is signed. Subject to subsection (c) and sections
7 and 8, the filing operates as a stay of the proceeding.
(b) Parties shall file promptly with the tribunal notice in a record when a
collaborative law process concludes. The stay of the proceeding under
subsection (a) is lifted when the notice is filed. The notice may not specify any
reason for termination of the process.
(c) A tribunal in which a proceeding is stayed under subsection (a) may
require parties and collaborative lawyers to provide a status report on the
collaborative law process and the proceeding. A status report may include only
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information on whether the process is ongoing or concluded. It may not include
a report, assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other
communication regarding a collaborative law process or collaborative law
matter.
(d) A tribunal may not consider a communication made in violation of
subsection (c).
(e) A tribunal shall provide parties notice and an opportunity to be heard
before dismissing a proceeding in which a notice of collaborative process is
filed based on delay or failure to prosecute.
Comment
This section authorizes parties to enter into a collaborative law participation
agreement to attempt to resolve matters in pending proceedings, a subject
discussed in the Prefatory Note. See supra pp. 450-51. To give the collaborative
law process time and breathing space to operate, it creates a stay of proceedings
from the time the tribunal receives written notice that the parties have executed
a collaborative law participation agreement until it receives written notice that
the collaborative law process is concluded. The stay of proceedings is qualified
by section 7, which authorizes a tribunal to issue emergency orders
notwithstanding the stay, and section 8, which authorizes a tribunal to approve
an agreement resulting from a collaborative law process.
This section is based on court rules and statutes recognizing collaborative
law in a number of jurisdictions. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2013 (West Supp.
2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-70 to -79 (2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.0072 (Vernon 2008); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.603 (Vernon 2006); CAL.
CONTRA COSTA SUPER. CT. LOCAL R. 12.5; CAL. L.A. SUPER. CT. LOCAL
R. 14.26; CAL. S.F. SUPER. CT. LOCAL R. 11.17; CAL. SONOMA SUPER. CT.

LOCAL R. 9.26; LA. DIsT. CT. R. 39.0; MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 111.05 (2008);
MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 304.05 (2008); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 4-510(l)(D) (2009);
In re Domestic Relations-Collaborative Conflict Resolution in Dissolution of
Marriage Cases, Fla. Admin. Order No. 07-20-B (Fla. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2007)
(authorizing the collaborative conflict alternative resolution model in Brevard
County, Florida).
Section 6(c) authorizes a tribunal to ask for status reports on the
collaborative law process in pending proceedings while the stay created by the
notice of collaborative law is in effect. It also put limitations on the scope of the
information that can be requested by the status report. The provisions of these
sections are based on section 7 of the Uniform Mediation Act, adapted for
collaborative law. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 7, 7A U.L.A. 135-36 (2006).
Subsections 6(c) and (d) recognize that the tribunal asking for the status report
may rule on the matter being negotiated in the collaborative law process and
should not be influenced by the behavior of the parties or counsel therein. Its
provisions would not permit the tribunal to ask in a status report whether a
particular party engaged in "good faith" negotiation, or to state whether a party
had been "the problem" in reaching a settlement. See Lande, Using Dispute
System Design Methods, supra, at 104 & n.185. The status report only can ask
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for non-substantive information related to scheduling and whether the
collaborative law process is ongoing.
Some jurisdictions use statistical analysis of the timeliness of case
dispositions to evaluate judicial performance, and sometimes those statistics are
made available to the public. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-5.5-103, -105
(West Supp. 2009); UTAH R. JuD. ADMIN. 3-111.01 to -111.02 (2009); Colorado
Office of Judicial Performance Evaluation, Commissions on Judicial
Performance, http://www.cojudicialperformance.com/index.cfm (last visited
May 25, 2010). Judicial administrators are encouraged to recognize that while
cases in which a collaborative law participation agreement is signed are
technically "pending," they should not be considered under active judicial
management for statistical or evaluation purposes until the collaborative law
process is terminated.

SECTION 7. EMERGENCY ORDER. During a collaborative law
process, a tribunal may issue emergency orders to protect the health, safety,
welfare, or interest of a party or [insert term for family or household member as
defined in [state civil protection order statute]].
Comment
The collaborative law process terminates if a party seeks an emergency
order of the kind authorized by this section. Section 5(c)(2) ends the stay of
proceedings created by section 6(a). Parties may, however, fail to provide notice
of the termination of a collaborative law process to each other and the tribunal.
Additionally, an emergency order might be sought in a new proceeding after a
collaborative law process terminates.
To avoid any possible confusion, this section authorizes tribunals to issue
emergency orders despite the execution of a collaborative law participation
agreement or a stay of proceedings under section 6(a). A collaborative lawyer is
also authorized to seek or defend an application for an emergency order despite
the termination of the collaborative law process under the time limited terms
and conditions of section 9(c)(2).
Section 7 is thus one of the act's provisions addressing the safety needs of
victims of coercion and violence in collaborative law. It is based on the concern
that a party in a collaborative law process may be a victim of such violence or
coercion or a dependent of a party such as a child may be threatened with abuse
or abduction while a collaborative law process is ongoing. A party should not be
left without access to a tribunal during such an emergency.
The reach of this section is not limited to victims of coercion and violence
themselves. It extends to members of their families and households. Each state
is free to define the scope of this section by cross referencing its civil protection
order statute. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 6211 (West 2004) (defining family
or household member to include current and former spouses, cohabitants, and
persons in a dating relationship, as well as persons with a child in common, or
any other person related by blood or marriage), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.50.010 (West 2005) (including in the definition of "[fjamily or household
members," current and former spouses, domestic partners and cohabitants,

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/2

60

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: Uniform Collaborative Law Act

2009]

UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LA WACT

481

persons with a child in common, persons in a current or former dating
relationship, and persons related by blood or marriage), and S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-4-20(b) (1986 & Supp. 2008) (defining family or household member to
mean current or former spouses, persons with a child in common, or a male and
female who are or were cohabiting).
The reach of this section is also not limited to emergencies involving
threats to physical safety. The term "interest" encompasses financial interest or
reputational interest as well. This section, in effect, authorizes a tribunal
otherwise authorized to do so to issue emergency provisional relief to protect a
party in any critical area as it would in any civil dispute. A party who finds out
that another party is secretly looting assets from a business, for example, while
participating in a collaborative law process can seek an emergency restraining
order under this section and the court is authorized to grant it despite the stay of
proceedings under section 6(b).

SECTION 8. APPROVAL OF AGREEMENT BY TRIBUNAL.
A tribunal may approve an agreement resulting from a collaborative law
process.
Legislative Note: In states where judicialproceduresfor management
of proceedings may be prescribedonly by court rule or administrative
guideline and not by legislative act, the duties of courts and other
tribunals listed in sections 6 through 8 should be adopted by the
appropriatemeasure.
Comment
Section 5(h) authorizes parties who reach agreements to present them to a
tribunal for approval without terminating a collaborative law process. This
section authorizes the tribunal to review and approve the agreement of the
parties if required by law, as in, for example, many divorce settlements,
settlements of infants' estates, or class action settlements. See UNIF. MARRIAGE
& DIVORCE ACT § 306(d), 9A U.L.A. 248-49 (1998) (noting that the parties'
agreement may be incorporated into the divorce decree if the court finds that it
is "not unconscionable" regarding the property and maintenance and "not
unsatisfactory" regarding support); FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (discussing the
standard for judicial evaluation of settlement of a class action, which is that the
settlement must not be a result of fraud or collusion and that the settlement must
be fair, adequate, and reasonable); Mnookin, supra,at 1015-16.

SECTION 9. DISQUALIFICATION OF COLLABORATIVE
LAWYER AND LAWYERS IN ASSOCIATED LAW FIRM.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c), a collaborative lawyer is
disqualified from appearing before a tribunal to represent a party in a
proceeding related to the collaborative matter.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) and sections 10 and 11, a
lawyer in a law firm with which the collaborative lawyer is associated is
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disqualified from appearing before a tribunal to represent a party in a
proceeding related to the collaborative matter if the collaborative lawyer is
disqualified from doing so under subsection (a).
(c) A collaborative lawyer or a lawyer in a law firm with which the
collaborative lawyer is associated may represent a party:
(1) to ask a tribunal to approve an agreement resulting from the
collaborative law process; or
(2) to seek or defend an emergency order to protect the health, safety,
welfare, or interest of a party, or [insert term for family or household member as
defined in [state civil protection order statute]] if a successor lawyer is not
immediately available to represent that person. In that event, subsections (a) and
(b) apply when the party, or [insert term for family or household member] is
represented by a successor lawyer or reasonable measures are taken to protect
the health, safety, welfare, or interest of that person.
Comment
The disqualification requirement for collaborative lawyers after
collaborative law concludes is a fundamental defining characteristic of
collaborative law. As previously discussed in the Prefatory Note, this section
extends the disqualification provision to "matters related to the collaborative
matter" in addition to the matter described in the collaborative law participation
agreement. See supra pp. 451-52. It also extends the disqualification provision
to lawyers in a law firm with which the collaborative lawyer is associated in
addition to the collaborative lawyer him or herself, so called "imputed
disqualification." See supra p. 452. Appropriate exceptions to the
disqualification requirement are made for representation to seek emergency
orders for a limited time (see section 7) and to allow collaborative lawyers to
present agreements to a tribunal for approval (section 5(f) and 8).

SECTION 10. LOW-INCOME PARTIES.
(a) The disqualification of section 9(a) applies to a collaborative lawyer
representing a party with or without fee.
(b) After a collaborative law process concludes, another lawyer in a law
firm with which a collaborative lawyer disqualified under section 9(a) is
associated may represent a party without fee in the collaborative matter or a
matter related to the collaborative matter if:
(1) the party has an annual income that qualifies the party for free legal
representation under the criteria established by the law firm for free legal
representation;
(2) the collaborative law participation agreement so provides; and
(3) the collaborative lawyer is isolated from any participation in the
collaborative matter or a matter related to the collaborative matter through
procedures within the law firm which are reasonably calculated to isolate the
collaborative lawyer from such participation.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol38/iss2/2

62

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: Uniform Collaborative Law Act

2009)

UNIFORM COLLABORATIVE LA WACT

483

Comment
As previously discussed in the Prefatory Note, this section allows parties to
modify the imputed disqualification requirement by advance agreement for
lawyers in a law firm which represents low-income clients without fee. See
supra pp. 452-54.

SECTION 11. GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY AS PARTY.
(a) The disqualification of section 9(a) applies to a collaborative lawyer
representing a party that is a government or governmental subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality.
(b) After a collaborative law process concludes, another lawyer in a law
firm with which the collaborative lawyer is associated may represent a
government or governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality in the
collaborative matter or a matter related to the collaborative matter if:
(1) the collaborative law participation agreement so provides; and
(2) the collaborative lawyer is isolated from any participation in the
collaborative matter or a matter related to the collaborative matter through
procedures within the law firm which are reasonably calculated to isolate the
collaborative lawyer from such participation.
Comment
This section allows parties to agree in advance to modify the imputed
disqualification requirement for lawyers in a law firm which represents the
government or its agencies or subdivisions. The rationale for creating this
exception to the imputed disqualification rule is discussed in the Prefatory Note.
See supra p. 454.

SECTION 12. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION. Except as
provided by law other than this [act], during the collaborative law process, on
the request of another party, a party shall make timely, full, candid, and
informal disclosure of information related to the collaborative matter without
formal discovery. A party also shall update promptly previously disclosed
information that has materially changed. Parties may define the scope of
disclosure during the collaborative law process.
Comment
Voluntary informal disclosure of information related to a matter is a
defining characteristic of collaborative law. The rationale for this section is
described in the Prefatory Note. See supra pp. 454-57.

PROFESSIONAL
OF
STANDARDS
13.
SECTION
RESPONSIBILITY AND MANDATORY REPORTING NOT
AFFECTED. This [act] does not affect:
(1) the professional responsibility obligations and standards applicable to a
lawyer or other licensed professional; or
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(2) the obligation of a person to report abuse or neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation of a child or adult under the law of this state.

Comment
The relationship between the act and the standards of professional
responsibility for collaborative lawyers is discussed in the Prefatory Note. See
supra pp. 446-47. In the interests of clarity, this section reaffirms that the act
does not alter the professional responsibility or child abuse and neglect
reporting obligations of all professionals, lawyers and nonlawyers alike, who
participate in a collaborative law process.

SECTION 14. APPROPRIATENESS OF COLLABORATIVE
LAW PROCESS. Before a prospective party signs a collaborative law
participation agreement, a prospective collaborative lawyer shall:
(1) assess with the prospective party factors the lawyer reasonably believes
relate to whether a collaborative law process is appropriate for the prospective
party's matter;
(2) provide the prospective party with information that the lawyer
reasonably believes is sufficient for the party to make an informed decision
about the material benefits and risks of a collaborative law process as compared
to the material benefits and risks of other reasonably available alternatives for
resolving the proposed collaborative matter, such as litigation, mediation,
arbitration, or expert evaluation; and
(3) advise the prospective party that:
(A) after signing an agreement if a party initiates a proceeding or seeks
tribunal intervention in a pending proceeding related to the collaborative matter,
the collaborative law process terminates;
(B) participation in a collaborative law process is voluntary and any
party has the right to terminate unilaterally a collaborative law process with or
without cause; and
(C) the collaborative lawyer and any lawyer in a law firm with which
the collaborative lawyer is associated may not appear before a tribunal to
represent a party in a proceeding related to the collaborative matter, except as
authorized by section 9(c), 10(b), or 11(b).

Comment
The policy behind the act's requirements for a prospective collaborative
lawyer's facilitating the informed consent of a party to participate in a
collaborative law process are discussed in the Prefatory Note. See supra
pp. 457-59.

SECTION 15. COERCIVE OR VIOLENT RELATIONSHIP.
(a) Before a prospective party signs a collaborative law participation
agreement, a prospective collaborative lawyer must make reasonable inquiry
whether the prospective party has a history of a coercive or violent relationship
with another prospective party.
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(b) Throughout a collaborative law process, a collaborative lawyer
reasonably and continuously shall assess whether the party the collaborative
lawyer represents has a history of a coercive or violent relationship with another
party.
(c) If a collaborative lawyer reasonably believes that the party the lawyer
represents or the prospective party who consults the lawyer has a history of a
coercive or violent relationship with another party or prospective party, the
lawyer may not begin or continue a collaborative law process unless:
(1) the party or the prospective party requests beginning or continuing
a process; and
(2) the collaborative lawyer reasonably believes that the safety of the
party or prospective party can be protected adequately during a process.
Comment
The section is a major part of the act's overall approach to assuring safety
for victims of coercive and violent relationships who are prospective parties or
parties in collaborative law. The subject is discussed extensively in the
Prefatory Note which covers the scope of the lawyer's duty under this section.
See suprapp. 459-63.

SECTION 16. CONFIDENTIALITY OF COLLABORATIVE
LAW COMMUNICATION. A collaborative law communication is
confidential to the extent agreed by the parties in a signed record or as provided
by law of this state other than this [act].
Comment
In subsequent sections, the act creates an evidentiary privilege for
collaborative law communications that prevents them from being admitted into
evidence in legal proceedings. As previously discussed in the Prefatory Note,
the drafters believe that a statute is required only to assure that aspect of
confidentiality relating to evidence compelled in judicial and other legal
proceedings. See supra pp. 463-65. This section encourages parties to a
collaborative law process to reach agreement on broader confidentiality matters
such as disclosure of collaborative law communications to third parties between
themselves.

SECTION 17. PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE
LAW COMMUNICATION;
FOR COLLABORATIVE
ADMISSIBILITY; DISCOVERY.
(a) Subject to sections 18 and 19, a collaborative law communication is
privileged under subsection (b), is not subject to discovery, and is not
admissible in evidence.
(b) In a proceeding, the following privileges apply:
(1) A party may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any other person
from disclosing, a collaborative law communication.
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(2) A nonparty participant may refuse to disclose, and may prevent any
other person from disclosing, a collaborative law communication of the
nonparty participant.
(c) Evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to
discovery does not become inadmissible or protected from discovery solely
because of its disclosure or use in a collaborative law process.
Comment
Overview
Section 17 sets forth the act's general structure for creating a privilege
prohibiting disclosure of collaborative law communications in legal
proceedings. It is based on similar provisions in the Uniform Mediation Act,
whose commentary should be consulted for more expansive discussion of the
issues raised here.
Holders ofthe Privilegefor CollaborativeLaw CommunicationsParties
Parties are holders of the collaborative law communications privilege. The
privilege of the parties draws upon the purpose, rationale, and traditions of the
attorney-client privilege in that its paramount justification is to encourage
candor by the parties, just as encouraging the client's candor is the central
justification for the attorney-client privilege. Using the attorney-client privilege
as a core base for the collaborative law communications privilege is also
particularly appropriate since the extensive participation of attorneys is a
hallmark of collaborative law.
The analysis for the parties as holders appears quite different at first
examination from traditional communications privileges because collaborative
law involves parties whose interests appear to be adverse, such as marital
partners now seeking a divorce. However, the law of attorney-client privilege
has considerable experience with situations in which multiple-client interests
may conflict, and those experiences support the analogy of the collaborative law
communications privilege to the attorney-client privilege. For example, the
attorney-client privilege has been recognized in the context of a joint defense in
which interests of the clients may conflict in part and yet one may prevent later
disclosure by another. See United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1336 (7th
Cir. 1979); Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 250 F.R.D.
575, 578-79 (D. Colo. 2007); United States v. Pizzonia, 415 F. Supp. 2d 168,
178 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Raytheon Co. v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 425, 42829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Visual Scene, Inc. v. Pilkington Bros., 508 So. 2d 437,
440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Robert B. Cummings, Get Your Own Lawyer!
An Analysis of In-House Counsel Advising Across the CorporateStructure After
Teleglobe, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 683, 689-91 (2008). But see Dexia Credit
Local v. Rogan, 231 F.R.D. 268, 273 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (stating that the joint
defense doctrine can be waived if parties become adverse); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Fuller, 695 S.W.2d 769, 774 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (refusing to apply the joint
defense doctrine to parties who were not directly adverse). See generally
Patricia Welles, A Survey of Attorney-Client Privilege in Joint Defense, 35 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 321 (1981) (exploring the logical extensions of the attorney-
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client privilege, including the doctrine of joint defense). Similarly, the attorneyclient privilege applies in the insurance context, in which an insurer generally
has the right to control the defense of an action brought against the insured,
when the insurer may be liable for some or all of the liability associated with an
adverse verdict. See, e.g., Med. Protective Co. v. Pang, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1049,
1060 (D. Ariz. 2008); In re Rules of Prof 1 Conduct & Insurer Imposed Billing
Rules & Procedures, 2 P.3d 806, 812 (Mont. 2000); Aviva Abramovsky, The
Enterprise Model of Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Tripartite Insurance
Defense Relationship,27 CARDozo L. REv. 193, 200-01 (2005).
Nonparty ParticipantsSuch as Experts
Of particular note is the act's addition of a privilege for the nonparty
participant, though limited to the communications by that individual in the
collaborative law process. Joint party retention of experts such as mental health
professionals and financial appraisers to perform various functions is a feature
of many models of collaborative law, and this provision encourages and
accommodates it. Extending the privilege to nonparties for their own
communications seeks to facilitate the candid participation of experts and others
who may have information and perspective that would facilitate resolution of
the matter. This provision would also cover statements prepared by such
persons for the collaborative law process and submitted as part of it, such as
experts' reports. Any party who expects to use such an expert report prepared to
submit in a collaborative law process later in a legal proceeding would have to
secure permission of all parties and the expert in order to do so. This is
consistent with the treatment of reports prepared for a collaborative law process
as collaborative law communications. See supra § 2(1).
As previously discussed in the comments to section 2(7), collaborative
lawyers are not nonparty participants under the act, as they maintain a
traditional attorney-client relationship with parties, which allocates to clients the
right to waive the attorney-client privilege, even over their lawyer's objection.
See supra p. 472.
Collaborative Law Communications Do Not Shield Otherwise Admissible or
DiscoverableEvidence
Section 17(c) concerning evidence otherwise discoverable and admissible
makes clear that relevant evidence may not be shielded from discovery or
admission at trial merely because it is communicated in a collaborative law
process. See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1119-1120 (2009); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
Dick Corp./Barton Malow, 215 F.R.D. 503, 506 (W.D. Pa. 2003); Rojas v.
Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 266 (Cal. 2004). For purposes of the collaborative
law communication privilege, it is the communication that is made in the
collaborative law process that is protected by the privilege, not the underlying
evidence giving rise to the communication. Evidence that is communicated in
collaborative law is subject to discovery, just as it would be if the collaborative
law process had not taken place. There is no "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine in the collaborative law communication privilege. For example, a party
who learns about a witness during a collaborative law proceeding is not
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precluded by the privilege from subpoenaing that witness should collaborative
law terminate and the matter wind up in a courtroom. FED. R. EVID. 408(b)
(noting that evidence is not excluded if offered for proving bias, prejudice,
undue delay, or obstruction); Wimsatt v. Superior Court, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200,
214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); Feldman v. Kritch, 824 So. 2d 274, 276 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.102(3) (West Supp. 2009), and DR
Lakes Inc. v. Brandsmart U.S.A., 819 So. 2d 971, 974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that privilege does not bar evidence to correct a mutual mistake in
settlement amount)).

SECTION 18. WAIVER AND PRECLUSION OF PRIVILEGE.
(a) A privilege under section 17 may be waived in a record or orally during
a proceeding if it is expressly waived by all parties and, in the case of the
privilege of a nonparty participant, it is also expressly waived by the nonparty
participant.
(b) A person that makes a disclosure or representation about a collaborative
law communication which prejudices another person in a proceeding may not
assert a privilege under section 17, but this preclusion applies only to the extent
necessary for the person prejudiced to respond to the disclosure or
representation.

SECTION 19. LIMITS OF PRIVILEGE.
(a) There is no privilege under section 17 for a collaborative law
communication that is:
(1) available to the public under [state open records act] or made
during a session of a collaborative law process that is open, or is required by
law to be open, to the public;
(2) a threat or statement of a plan to inflict bodily injury or commit a
crime of violence;
(3) intentionally used to plan a crime, commit or attempt to commit a
crime, or conceal an ongoing crime or ongoing criminal activity; or
(4) in an agreement resulting from the collaborative law process,
evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement.
(b) The privileges under section 17 for a collaborative law communication
do not apply to the extent that a communication is:
(1) sought or offered to prove or disprove a claim or complaint of
professional misconduct or malpractice arising from or related to a collaborative
law process; or
(2) sought or offered to prove or disprove abuse, neglect,
abandonment, or exploitation of a child or adult, unless the [child protective
services agency or adult protective services agency] is a party to or otherwise
participates in the process.
(c) There is no privilege under section 17 if a tribunal finds, after a hearing
in camera, that the party seeking discovery or the proponent of the evidence has
shown the evidence is not otherwise available, the need for the evidence
substantially outweighs the interest in protecting confidentiality, and the
collaborative law communication is sought or offered in:
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(1) a court proceeding involving a felony [or misdemeanor]; or
(2) a proceeding seeking rescission or reformation of a contract arising
out of the collaborative law process or in which a defense to avoid liability on
the contract is asserted.
(d) If a collaborative law communication is subject to an exception under
subsection (b) or (c), only the part of the communication necessary for the
application of the exception may be disclosed or admitted.
(e) Disclosure or admission of evidence excepted from the privilege under
subsection (b) or (c) does not make the evidence or any other collaborative law
communication discoverable or admissible for any other purpose.
(f) The privileges under section 17 do not apply if the parties agree in
advance in a signed record, or if a record of a proceeding reflects agreement by
the parties, that all or part of a collaborative law process is not privileged. This
subsection does not apply to a collaborative law communication made by a
person that did not receive actual notice of the agreement before the
communication was made.
Comment
UnconditionalExceptions to Privilege
The act articulates specific and exclusive exceptions to the broad grant of
privilege provided to collaborative law communications. They are based on
limited but vitally important values such as protection against serious bodily
injury, crime prevention, and the right of someone accused of professional
misconduct to respond that outweigh the importance of confidentiality in the
collaborative law process. The exceptions are similar to those contained in the
Uniform Mediation Act. See generally UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6, 7A U.L.A.
124 (2006).
As with other privileges, when it is necessary to consider evidence in order
to determine if an exception applies, the act contemplates that a court will hold
an in camera proceeding at which the claim for exemption from the privilege
can be confidentially asserted and defended.
Exception to Privilegefor Written, But Not Oral,Agreements
Of particular note is the exception that permits evidence of a collaborative
law communication "in an agreement resulting from the collaborative law
process, evidenced by a record signed by all parties to the agreement." See
supra § 9(a)(4). The exception permits such evidence to be introduced in a
subsequent proceeding convened to determine whether the terms of that
settlement agreement have been breached.
The words "agreement . . . evidenced by a record signed by all parties" in

this exception refer to written and executed agreements, those recorded by tape
recording and ascribed to by the parties on the tape, and other electronic means
to record and sign, as defined in sections 2(12) and 2(14). In other words, a
party's notes about an oral agreement would not be "an agreement . .. signed by
all parties." On the other hand, the following situations would be considered a
signed agreement: a handwritten agreement that the parties have signed, an e-
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mail exchange between the parties in which they agree to particular provisions,
and a tape recording in which they state what constitutes their agreement.
This exception is noteworthy only for what is not included: oral
agreements. The disadvantage of exempting oral settlements is that nearly
everything said during a collaborative law session could bear on either whether
the parties came to an agreement or the content of the agreement. In other
words, an exception for oral agreements has the potential to swallow the rule of
privilege. As a result, parties might be less candid, not knowing whether a
controversy later would erupt over an oral agreement.
Despite the limitation on oral agreements, the act leaves parties other means
to preserve the agreement quickly. For example, parties can state their oral
agreement into the tape recorder and record their assent. One would also expect
that counsel will incorporate knowledge of a writing requirement into their
collaborative law representation practices.
Case-by-CaseExceptions
The exceptions in section 19(a) apply regardless of the need for the
evidence because society's interest in the information contained in the
collaborative law communications may be said to categorically outweigh its
interest in the confidentiality of those communications. In contrast, the
exceptions under section 19(b) would apply only in situations where the relative
strengths of society's interest in a collaborative law communication and a
party's interest in confidentiality can only be measured under the facts and
circumstances of the particular case. The act places the burden on the proponent
of the evidence to persuade the court in a non-public hearing that the evidence is
not otherwise available, that the need for the evidence substantially outweighs
the confidentiality interests, and that the evidence comes within one of the
exceptions listed under section 19(b). In other words, the exceptions listed in
section 19(b) include situations that should remain confidential but for
overriding concerns for justice.
Limited PreservationofParty Autonomy Regarding Confidentiality
Section 19(f) allows the parties to opt for a non-privileged collaborative law
process or session of the collaborative law process by mutual agreement and
thus furthers the act's policy of party self-determination. If the parties so agree,
the privilege sections of the act do not apply, thus fulfilling the parties
reasonable expectations regarding the confidentiality of that session. Parties
may use this option if they wish to rely on, and therefore use in evidence,
statements made during the collaborative law process. It is the parties and their
collaborative lawyers who make this choice. Even if the parties do not agree in
advance, they and all nonparty participants can waive the privilege pursuant to
section 18(a).
If the parties want to opt out, they should inform the nonparty participants
of this agreement, because without actual notice, the privileges of the act still
apply to the collaborative law communications of the persons who have not
been so informed until such notice is actually received. Thus, for example, if a
nonparty participant has not received notice that the opt-out has been invoked
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and speaks during the collaborative law process, that communication is
privileged under the act. If, however, one of the parties tells the nonparty
participant that the opt-out has been invoked, the privilege no longer attaches to
statements made after the actual notice has been provided, even though the
earlier statements remain privileged because of the lack of notice.

SECTION 20. AUTHORITY OF TRIBUNAL IN CASE OF
NONCOMPLIANCE.
(a) If an agreement fails to meet the requirements of section 4, or a lawyer
fails to comply with section 14 or 15, a tribunal may nonetheless find that the
parties intended to enter into a collaborative law participation agreement if they:
(1) signed a record indicating an intention to enter into a collaborative
law participation agreement; and
(2) reasonably believed they were participating in a collaborative law
process.
(b) If a tribunal makes the findings specified in subsection (a), and the
interests of justice require, the tribunal may:
(1) enforce an agreement evidenced by a record resulting from the
process in which the parties participated;
(2) apply the disqualification provisions of sections 5, 6, 9, 10, and 11;
and
(3) apply the privileges under section 17.

Comment

The act protects persons from inadvertently or inappropriately entering into
collaborative law participation agreements by establishing protections that
cannot be waived by the parties. Section 4 sets forth minimum standards for a
collaborative law participation agreement. Section 14 sets forth requirements for
a lawyer's facilitating informed party consent to participate in collaborative law.
Section 15 requires a lawyer to inquire into potential coercive and violent
relationships and take appropriate safety precautions.
Section 20 anticipates, however, that, as collaborative law expands in use
and popularity, claims will be made that agreements reached in collaborative
law should not be enforced, collaborative lawyers should not be disqualified,
and evidentiary privilege should not be recognized because of the failure of
collaborative lawyers to meet these requirements. This section takes the view
that, while parties should not be forced to participate in collaborative law
involuntarily (see section 5(b)), the failures of collaborative lawyers in drafting
agreements and making required disclosures and inquiries should not be visited
on parties whose conduct indicates an intention to participate in collaborative
law.
By analogy to the doctrine established allowing enforcement of arguably
flawed arbitration agreements, this section places the burden of proof on the
party seeking to enforce a collaborative law participation agreement or
agreements resulting from a collaborative law process despite the failures of
form, disclosure, or inquiry. See Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Bruno, 784 So. 2d
277, 280 (Ala. 2000) ("The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

71

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 38, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 2

492

HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:421

of proving the existence of a contract calling for arbitration ... ."); LaytonBlumenthal, Inc. v. Jack Wasserman Co., 111 N.Y.S.2d 919, 920 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1952) ("The burden is upon a party applying to compel another to arbitrate,
to establish that there was a plain intent by agreement to limit the parties to that
method of deciding disputes.").
Doubts about the parties' intentions should be resolved against
enforcement. To invoke its discretion under this section the tribunal must find
that a signed record of some kind-usually a written agreement-indicates that
the parties intended to participate in a collaborative law process. It cannot find
that the parties entered into a collaborative law process solely on the basis of an
oral agreement. The tribunal must also find that, despite the failings of the
participation agreement or the required disclosures, the parties nonetheless
intended to participate in a collaborative law process and reasonably believed
that they were doing so. If the tribunal makes those findings, this section gives it
the discretionary authority to enforce agreements resulting from the process the
parties engaged in and the other provisions of this act if the tribunal also finds
that the interests of justice so require.

SECTION 21. UNIFORMITY

OF APPLICATION AND

CONSTRUCTION. In applying and construing this uniform act,
consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with
respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.
Comment
While the drafters recognize that some such variations of collaborative law
are inevitable given its dynamic and diverse nature and early stage of
development, the specific benefits of uniformity of law should also be
emphasized. As discussed in the Prefatory Note, uniform adoption of this act
will make the law governing collaborative law more accessible and certain in
key areas and will thus encourage parties to participate in a collaborative law
process. See supra p. 434. Collaborative lawyers and parties will know the
standards under which collaborative law participation agreements will be
enforceable and courts can reasonably anticipate how the statute will be
interpreted. Moreover, uniformity of the law will provide greater protection of
collaborative law communications than any one state or choice-of-law doctrine
has the capacity to provide. No matter how much protection one state affords
confidentiality of collaborative law communications, for example, the
communication will not be protected against compelled disclosure in another
state if that state does not have the same level of protection.

SECTION 22. RELATION TO ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES
IN GLOBAL AND NATIONAL COMMERCE ACT. This [act]
modifies, limits, and supersedes the federal E-Sign, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 et seq.
(2006), but does not modify, limit, or supersede section 101(c) of that act, 15
U.S.C. § 7001(c), or authorize electronic delivery of any of the notices
described in § 103(b) of that act, 15 U.S.C. § 7003(b).
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[SECTION 23. SEVERABILITY. If any provision of this [act] or its
application to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does not
affect other provisions or applications of this [act] which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this [act] are severable.]
Legislative Note: Include this section only if the state lacks a general
severability statute or a decision by the highest court of this state
stating a general rule ofseverability.

SECTION 24. EFFECTIVE DATE. This [act] takes effect ....
Legislative Note: States should choose an effective datefor the act that
allows substantial time for notice to the bar and the public of its
provisions andfor the trainingof collaborativelawyers.
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